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MAY JUDGES ATTEND PRIVATELY FUNDED
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS? SHOULD
JUDICIAL EDUCATION BE PRIVATIZED?:
QUESTIONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS AND POLICY
Bruce A. Green*
INTRODUCTION
Three private institutions devote significant resources to educat-
ing judges: the Foundation for Research on Economics and the En-
vironment (FREE); the Law and Organizational Economics
Center (LOEC) of the University of Kansas; and the Law and Eco-
nomics Center (LEC) of the George Mason University School of
Law.1 Each of these institutions invites judges to attend free edu-
cational seminars, provides free food and lodging (in some cases, at
resort settings), and wholly or partially reimburses the judges'
travel expenses. 2 The various judicial seminars offered by these in-
stitutions are designed for and exclusively available to judges.3
Each institution offers seminars addressing topics relating to law-
and-economics. LEC and FREE also offer seminars relating to sci-
ence, and FREE also offers seminars relating to the environment.4
Dozens of entities-including foundations, corporations, and law
firms-contribute to these institutions' judicial education pro-
* Bruce A. Green is a Stein Professor of Law at Fordham University School of
Law and the director of the Louis Stein Center of Law and Ethics. This Article is
based on the following report: Bruce A. Green, Ethics of Judicial Education: An
Analysis of Private Charitable Gifts for Judicial Learning (Oct. 15, 1999). The report
was prepared for three foundations-the Charles G. Koch Foundation, the Claude R.
Lambe Foundation, and the Fred and Mary Koch Foundation, which retained the au-
thor to render, on a compensated basis, a report on the propriety of private founda-
tion support for judicial education programs. Id. at 2, 32 n.16. Additionally, this
Article draws on the author's remarks at a program entitled Continuing Education
for Federal Judges: Purpose, Problems and Public Perception-The Controversy Ex-
amined. The Conference was sponsored by the American Bar Association (ABA)
Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements at the ABA's annual meeting
in Chicago on August 5, 2001.
1. Bruce A. Green, Ethics of Judicial Education: An Analysis of Private Charita-
ble Gifts for Judicial Learning app. B, at 5-25 (Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Ethics of
Judicial Education] (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
2. Id.
3. Id. at app. B, at 5, 11, 21.
4. Id. at app. B, at 11-12.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
grams.5 Hundreds of judges have attended at least one seminar,
and many have attended more than one.6
Since at least 1979, privately funded programs for judicial educa-
tion, particularly in the area of law-and-economics, have been the
subject of public discussion7 and often public criticism.8 In 1980,
the Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown University
formally petitioned the United States Judicial Conference to ad-
dress the question of whether the Code of Judicial Ethics allowed
federal judges to attend such programs.9 In 1993, the Alliance for
Justice published a study that criticized the programs themselves
for improper academic bias. 10
Most recently, in July 2000, Community Rights Counsel (CRC)
published a study focusing on judicial seminars relating to environ-
mental law. 1 CRC argued that the seminars were a veiled effort to
lobby the judiciary. CRC also called for a ban on private reim-
bursement of judges' expenses in attending educational pro-
grams. 12 The concerns expressed in the CRC report prompted a
5. Id. at app. B, at 5, 12-13, 19.
6. Id. at app. B, at 11.
7. See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Large Corporations Bankroll Seminars for Federal
Judges, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1980, at Al; David Beckwith, Judges Study Free Market
Economics, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Feb. 5, 1979, at 1; Walter Guzzardi, Jr., Judges
Discover the World of Economics, FORTUNE, May 21, 1979, at 58; James Russell, Law
and the Economy: Mysteries of Money Disrobed for Judges, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 30,
1978, at Fl.
8. See Jack Anderson, State Dept. Obstructing Cambodia Aid, WASH. POST, Oct.
29, 1979, at D27.
More than 100 federal judges have gone to sunny Florida for a crash course
in conservative economics, courtesy of some of the biggest corporate fat cats
that will ever appear before them as defendants.
A confidential memo in the Senate Judiciary Committee calls the seminars
for judges "a brazen attempt by the Business Roundtable crowd to influence
the enforcement of antitrust laws."
The internal memo adds: "Financing for the program comes from compa-
nies like Proctor & Gamble, IBM and General Electric .... Isn't there any
question about the ethics of judges accepting, even indirectly, the hospitality
of defendants in federal cases?"
Id.
9. See Inst. for Pub. Representation, Petition for the Adoption of Guidelines for
Judicial Participation in Privately Sponsored Educational Programs for Federal
Judges and Other Relief Before the United States Judicial Conference, Aug. 29, 1980,
reprinted in LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Sept. 15, 1980, at 19 [hereinafter IPR Petition].
10. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST FOR PRIVATE GAIN (1993).
11. CMTY. RIGHTS COUNSEL, NOTHING FOR FREE: How PRIVATE JUDICIAL SEMI-
NARS ARE UNDERMINING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND BREAKING THE PUB-
LIC'S TRUST (2000).
12. Id. at 1-2.
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spate of editorials criticizing privately-funded judicial education, 3
as well as a program aired by ABC's 20/20, hosted by Barbara Wal-
ters, exposing so-called "Junkets for Judges."14 Senators John
Kerry and Russ Feingold supported a federal bill to bar federal
judges from attending private seminars (Kerry-Feingold bill).' 5
The attendance of judges at programs sponsored by the three
institutions has also sparked litigation. In a recent case, a party
contended that a judge who had attended privately-funded semi-
nars could not fairly preside over the action.' 6 In another case, a
judge planning to attend a seminar sponsored by FREE raised the
question whether he must therefore recuse himself "out of an
abundance of caution and fairness. 17
Notwithstanding these expressions of concern, judicial organiza-
tions such as the Judicial Conference of the United States have per-
mitted judges to attend privately-funded seminars. Individual
judges, determining that their attendance does not contravene ap-
plicable legal or ethical restrictions, have done so. In May 2001, in
remarks to the American Law Institute, Chief Justice Rehnquist
defended privately funded programs as "a valuable and necessary
source of education in addition to that provided by the Federal Ju-
dicial Center."18 Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States and the Board of the Federal Judicial
Center in opposing the Kerry-Feingold bill.
The first parts of this Article address questions of judicial ethics
raised by privately-funded judicial seminars and how they are an-
13. See, e.g., Editorial, A Blot on Judicial Ethics, WASH. POST, July 28, 2000, at
A24; Editorial, A Threat to Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A34; Just
Say No to Judge Junkets, USA TODAY, May 1, 2001, at 14A; Editorial, Mr. Rehnquist
on Junkets, WASH. POST, May 20, 2001, at B6.
14. 20/20: Junkets for Judges (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 6, 2001).
15. The Judicial Education Reform Act of 2000, S. 2990, 106th Cong. (Kerry-Fein-
gold Bill).
16. In re Aguida, 241 F.3d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 2001). As discussed below, both the
district court and the court of appeals rejected the argument. See infra notes 105-125
and accompanying text. Likewise, in Marshall v. Marshall, No. 276, 815-407 (Harris
Co. Probate Ct.), cited in Susan Borreson, Fears of Influence: Judges Say Seminar
Sponsors Hold No Sway in Court, TEX. LAW., Sept. 20, 1999, at 1, the court ruled that
the presiding judge's attendance at an LOEC program did not create the appearance
of impropriety and was not grounds for recusal. See Susan Borreson, Fears of Influ-
ence: Judges Say Seminar Sponsors Hold No Sway in Court, TEX. LAW., Sept. 20, 1999,
at 1.
17. See Zuniga v. Koch Midstream Servs. Co., No. MO-98-CA-169-F (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 12, 1999) (Fergeson, J.).
18. Remarks by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist before the American Law
Institute Annual Meeting (May 14, 2001), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/sp_05-14-01.html.
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swered by existing legal and ethical standards. Part I discusses the
relevant restrictions and describes the courts' determination that
these restrictions do not bar judges' participation in judicial semi-
nars. Part II considers whether this determination is rooted in a
reasonable understanding of existing restrictions and concludes
that it is. There is ample support for the view that judges may ordi-
narily attend educational seminars at no cost to themselves and
have their expenses reimbursed. There is also ample reason to
conclude that judges who attend judicial seminars are generally not
required to recuse themselves from cases involving a party or affili-
ate that contributed to the educational institution that organized
and sponsored the seminar.
Part III considers whether the existing standards and processes
that judges have used to address the controversy are sufficient. It
concludes that these standards and processes do not completely re-
solve the controversy. The question of whether judges should at-
tend privately-funded judicial seminars is not solely a question of
individual judges' ethics to be resolved by self-regulation. It is also
a question of judicial policy that should be resolved by the judiciary
as an institution. The question is, in essence, whether judicial edu-
cation should be privatized. This question is posed uniquely by
LEC, FREE, and LOEC, the only private institutions regularly of-
fering expenses-paid judicial seminars oriented toward a particular
perspective on legal questions that come regularly before the
courts.
In considering these questions, the Article focuses particularly
on law-and-economics seminars, which have existed the longest
and have been criticized the most. The Article begins with a fac-
tual assumption central to criticisms of judges' participation in
these seminars-namely, that the seminars are "biased" in the fol-
lowing sense: although there is room for debate about whether, to
what extent, and how economics principles should be employed in
various legal contexts, the directors of these programs hold particu-
lar views on these questions that influence how they organize the
seminars and to whom they teach them.19 In particular, the pro-
19. See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 7, at 1 (quoting unnamed FIC economist: "[The
economics course sponsored by LOEC is] an intellectually-respectable course.., and
the reading list brackets all schools .... But it has a distinct Chicago school flavor to
it: it gets across a certain free market point of view, that there are plenty of competi-
tive forces out there and regulation by government isn't necessary. I would certainly
hope that judges didn't rely solely on this approach .... ."); id. (quoting an unnamed
economist: "[The LOEC course instruction was] rather cleverly given the appearance
of neutrality, but is actually stacked in favor of the Chicago school.")
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gram directors favor the application of "free market" economics
principles20 in situations where individuals with a different legal
philosophy would employ alternative approaches to developing or
interpreting the law.21 Contributors generally share the legal phi-
losophy of those who direct the various educational institutions.22
Further, contributors anticipate that some judges, having attended
these seminars, will be more inclined to employ economics princi-
ples that accord with the contributors' philosophy.23 Whether the
seminars are academically "biased" in the above sense,24 or in
other senses, is a question that, until now, judicial institutions have
not thought necessary to resolve. Apparently, the judiciary be-
lieves that it is permissible for judges to participate even if charges
of bias are true. This Article concludes that the judiciary is right as
a matter of existing judicial regulation, but that the inquiry should
not end with the application of existing laws and rules of judicial
ethics.
20. For instance, LOEC's literature indicates that its Economics Institute for State
Judges "emphasizes," among other things, that "Competitive markets, private owner-
ship, and freedom of contract promote the efficient use of resources and provide a
continual stimulus for innovation"; that "Profits direct business toward socially bene-
ficial activities that increase wealth"; and that through "the 'Invisible Hand' Princi-
ples," "market prices bring personal self interest and the general welfare into
harmony." Law and Organizational Economics Center (L.O.E.C.), Economics Insti-
tute for State Judges, http://www.loec.org/recruiting2.html (visited August 12, 1999).
21. For example, the LOEC's 1998-99 annual report stated: "The goal of the
LOEC's Judicial Education Programs is to provide state judges with a basic under-
standing of economic concepts that often are at the heart of legal disputes and, as an
intended by-product, foster a greater appreciation of entrepreneurship, free markets,
private property rights, and the rule of law."
22. See, e.g., Charles Koch, Empowering the Entrepreneur Within, CHIEF EXECU-
TIVE, Mar. 1998, at 46-49 (extolling the virtues of free market principles and explain-
ing means in which company's management philosophy can harness the power of free
market ideas).
23. See John J. Fialka, How Koch Industries Tries to Influence Judicial System,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at A20 ("The seminars illustrate how, in recent years, Koch
has sought to influence thinking in the judicial system.")
24. It should be noted that the question of whether an educational program is
academically "biased" is separate and distinct from the question, addressed later in
this Article, of whether a judge's participation in extrajudicial activities may give rise
to an impermissible judicial bias (e.g., whether it may lead a judge to impermissibly
favor a party). See text accompanying notes infra 153-79.
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I. BACKGROUND TO THE QUESTIONS OF
JUDICIAL REGULATION
A. Generally Applicable Restrictions
When presiding over judicial proceedings, judges are required to
be neutral and impartial.25 To insure an impartial judiciary, judges'
extrajudicial conduct and relationships are subject to various bod-
ies of regulation. These include the Constitution's Due Process
Clause,2 6 federal and state statutes,27 and codes of judicial ethics.28
Together, these are intended to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial system.
1. Constitutional Requirements
As interpreted by the Supreme Court and other courts, the Due
Process Clause sometimes requires judges to "recuse themselves
when they face possible temptations to be biased, even when they
exhibit no actual bias against a party or a case. ' ' 29 Although the
common law rule was that a judge would be "disqualified for direct
pecuniary interest and nothing else,"3 the constitutional rule goes
somewhat further. The Due Process Clause requires disqualifica-
tion where the judge has a direct pecuniary or other interest in the
outcome of the case, so that there is a significant incentive for a
judge to favor one side.31 The constitutional provision does not
25. See, e.g., Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 101-111 app. 4 (West 2001) (requiring judges to disclose
certain financial information); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 5 (Law. Co-op. 1992)
(same).
28. The federal judiciary, and most state judiciaries, have adopted, with different
degrees of variation, a code of conduct drafted by the American Bar Association. As
of May 1999, twenty-three states had adopted new codes of judicial conduct based on
the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Memorandum of Cynthia Gray, Di-
rector, Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations, American Judicature Society (un-
dated) (on file with author).
29. Del Vecchio v. I11. Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994).
30. See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609, 618-19
(1947) ("The common law of disqualification, unlike the civil law, was clear and sim-
ple: a judge was disqualified for direct pecuniary interest and nothing else .... Dis-
qualification for bias represents a complete departure from common law principles.").
31. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (decision in case
would set legal precedent bearing directly on two pending cases filed by judge as
plaintiff); Ward v. City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (city mayor could not sit
as traffic court judge because responsibility for town finances provided incentive to
find against defendants to "maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's
court"); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (judge could not try de-
fendant for contempt of court based on defendant's insults during previous trial, be-
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require recusal, however, where there are other conceivable rea-
sons for a judge to be biased. For example, even though they may
offer a "possible temptation" to be biased, "[m]atters of kinship
[or] personal bias ... would generally be matters of legislative dis-
cretion. '32 As one court has explained:
This merely recognizes, at least implicitly, that in the real world,
"possible temptations" to be biased abound. Judges are human;
like all humans, their outlooks are shaped by their lives' exper-
iences. It would be unrealistic to suppose that judges do not
bring to the bench those experiences and attendant biases they
may create. A person could find something in the background
of most judges which in many cases would lead that person to
conclude that the judge has a "possible temptation" to be bi-
ased. But not all temptations are created equal. We expect-
even demand-that judges rise above these potential biasing in-
fluences, and in most cases we presume judges do.
As the common law recognized, and as experience teaches, the
lure of lucre is a particularly strong motivation, and therefore
judges ought to be prohibited from presiding over cases in
whose outcomes they have a direct financial interest. Of course,
the Supreme Court has held that the due process clause requires
disqualification for interests besides pecuniary interests. But the
constitutional standard the Supreme Court has applied in deter-
mining when disqualification is necessary recognizes the same
reality the common law recognized: judges are subject to a myr-
iad of biasing influences; judges for the most part are presump-
tively capable of overcoming those influences and rendering
evenhanded justice; and only a strong, direct interest in the out-
come of a case is sufficient to overcome that presumption of
evenhandedness.33
Thus, for the most part, the Constitution leaves questions of judi-
cial disqualification, and judicial ethics generally, to be decided by
legislators through the enactment of relevant statutes, by the judi-
ciary through the adoption and interpretation of codes of judicial
ethics, and by judges individually.34
cause defendant's insults were "apt to strike 'at the most vulnerable and human
qualities of a judge's temperament"'); Turmey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge in
criminal case was paid only if defendant was convicted).
32. Aetna Life Ins., 475 U.S. at 820; see also Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
33. Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1372-73.
34. Id. at 1391 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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2. Statutory Requirements
Various federal and state statutes impose restrictions beyond the
constitutional ones.35 Of course, criminal law forbids judges from
seeking or accepting a bribe;3" however, there is no plausible way
of construing invitations to the judicial seminars as a bribe.37 Of
greater relevance here are statutes requiring judges to recuse them-
selves in circumstances where they have, or appear to have, a bias
or interest that would influence their decisions. For example, the
federal disqualification statute, which dates back to 1911,38 requires
a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding where his impartial-
ity might reasonably be questioned. 39 The statute also identifies
particular circumstances in which a judge must disqualify himself,
including "[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concern-
35. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A., §§ 101-111 app. 4 (West 2001) (requiring judges to make
certain financial disclosures); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268B, § 5 (Law. Co-op 1992)
(same).
36. For example, a federal criminal statute makes it a crime for a federal judge to
seek or accept compensation in relation to any proceeding, request for a ruling, or
other determination or matter involving the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000).
37. Under either federal or state law, it would be a crime to give a judge a bribe or
gratuity-that is, generally speaking, to provide something of value to a judge in or-
der to influence, or in return for, the judge's performance of an official act. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 201. But no one has argued that contributors to institutions that conduct
judicial seminars are engaged in bribery, and such a claim would not be plausible.
There is no claim that contributors give anything directly to judges, control the educa-
tional institutions that directly deal with judges, or decide which judges are invited to
participate. Nor is there any indication that contributors seek or expect to receive
anything from judges in exchange for their contributions. For example, there are no
reports that, when they appear as parties in litigation before judges who have at-
tended a judicial seminar, contributors call their role to the judges' attention. Nor is
there any other reason to believe that contributors expect that, in gratitude for sup-
porting judicial seminars, judges who attend the seminars will favor the contributors
themselves or their corporate and individual affiliates. Such an expectation would be
foolish. It is doubtful that judges themselves would even take note of such contribu-
tions were they not called to the judges' attention by the media or another party. See,
e.g., Barbash, supra note 7, at A3 ('.Most of the judges interviewed said they had been
unaware of the corporations sponsoring the seminars. Most also said that the corpo-
rate sponsorship did not concern them."). Rather, the principal concerns are centered
on the impact of judicial seminars on judges' general judicial philosophy and onjudges' understanding of how to resolve particular legal questions, regardless of which
parties are involved in a particular lawsuit.
38. See generally Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds
for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 663-80 (1985)
(describing federal disqualification statutes and their history); Randall J. Litteneker,
Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHt. L. REV. 236, 236
n.4 (1978).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
948
JUDICIAL ETHICS AND POLICY
ing the proceeding";40 where he worked on the matter while in pri-
vate practice or as a government employee;4 and where he or a
close family member has a financial interest or other interest or
involvement in the controversy.42 The federal disqualification stat-
ute requires a judge to "inform himself about his personal and fidu-
ciary financial interests,' 43  in order to decide whether
disqualification is required.
Various state and federal laws also require judges to disclose cer-
tain financial information.44 For example, federal law requires fed-
eral judges to file annual financial disclosure forms.45 These forms
identify and describe all gifts of more than a minimal amount re-
ceived in the prior year (except when received from a relative or, in
the case of food, lodging, or entertainment, as "personal hospital-
ity"),46 and all reimbursements in more than minimal amounts re-
ceived in the prior year.47  Additionally, certain state laws
applicable to government officials generally, or to judges in partic-
ular, impose further restrictions on state judges, including restric-
tions on their receipt of gifts.
48
3. Codes of Conduct
Finally, judges are regulated by judicial codes of conduct
adopted by state and federal judiciaries to govern the conduct of
judges. The federal judiciary and most state judiciaries have
adopted, with different degrees of variation, a code of conduct
drafted by the American Bar Association.49 The earliest judicial
40. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2), (3).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (5).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 455(c).
44. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 8; 5 U.S.C., §§ 101-111, app. 4; MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 268B, § 5 (Law. Co-op 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4 (West
2001); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1104-1105 (West 2000).
45. 5 U.S.C.A., app. 4, §§ 101-111 (West 2001).
46. 5 U.S.C.A., app. 4, § 102(a)(2)(A).
47. 5 U.S.C.A., app. 4, § 102(a)(2)(B).
48. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 170.9 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-11
(1998); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 425/1-10 (West Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T § 15-505 (2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 268A §§ 2-3 (Law. Co-op 1992); OHIO.
REV. CODE ANN. § 120.03(E) (West 2001); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103(c); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 572.051 (Vernon 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1.-639.4 (Michie
1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.52.140-150 (West 2000). See also discussion infra
at notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
49. As of May 1999, twenty-three states had adopted new codes of judicial con-
duct based on the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. (All of these, how-
ever, deviated from the 1990 model to some degree). Additionally, twenty-four other
states had revised their existing judicial codes (which were generally based on the
2002] 949
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code, the ABA Canons of Judicial Conduct, was drafted by a com-
mittee under the direction of Chief Justice Taft and approved by
the ABA in 1924.50 This early code was comprehensively reviewed
from 1969 to 1972 by an ABA committee chaired by retired Chief
Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court and com-
prised of thirteen members, including Supreme Court Justice Pot-
ter Stewart and five other state or federal judges." The committee
produced the Code of Judicial Conduct that was approved by the
ABA in August 1972.52 The Code was substantially amended in
1990, based on the work of a drafting committee that, again, in-
cluded the substantial participation of judges.53 The existing Code
is, thus, a contemporary document; it is the product of considerable
work, public discussion and deliberation by lawyers and judges re-
flecting a range of backgrounds and perspectives that builds on de-
cades of prior work and judicial tradition. The general principles
embodied in the Code were not lightly conceived and deserve
respect.
In general, the Code enjoins judges to maintain a "high standard
of conduct ' 54 and to "promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary."55 Among the specific provisions
1972 ABA model) to incorporate some or many provisions of the 1990 model. Like-
wise, the United States Judicial Conference revised its former code (based on the
1972 ABA model) to add new material, including provisions based on the 1990 model.
Memorandum of Cynthia Gray, Director, Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations,
American Judicature Society (undated) (on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal).
50. See LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE
(1992).
51. Id.
52. See E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1973).
53. See MILORD, supra note 50.
54. Canon 1 of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990), titled "A Judge
Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary," provides:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforc-
ing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards
so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.
The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that
objective.
55. Canon 2 of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990), titled "A Judge
Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's
Activities," provides in part:
A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.
A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to
influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend
the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or
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intended to ensure fair and impartial judicial decision making are
those forbidding judges from engaging in ex parte communications
concerning pending or imminent proceedings 56 and requiring
judges to recuse themselves when they have "a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.""
Of most direct relevance to the question of whether judges may
attend privately-funded judicial seminars are various provisions ad-
dressing judges' extrajudicial activities. 8 Canon 4(B), for instance,
others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge ....
56. Canon 3 of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr (1990), titled "A Judge
Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently," provides in
part:
(7) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications,
or consider communications made to the judge outside the presence of the
parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding except that:
(b) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law appli-
cable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties
of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the
parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
57. Canon 3 of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr (1990) further provides
in part:
E. DISQUALIFICATION
(i) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not lim-
ited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding...
A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic
interests ....
58. Canon 4 of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990), titled, "A Judge
Shall So Conduct the Judge's Extra-Judicial Activities as to Minimize the Risk of
Conflict With Judicial Obligations," provides in part:
A. EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL. A judge shall con-
duct all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do not:
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a
judge;
(2) demean the judicial office; or
(3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.
B. VOCATIONAL ACTIVITIES. A judge may speak, write, lecture,
teach and participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the
legal system, the administration of justice and non-legal subjects, subject to
the requirements of this Code.
C. GOVERNMENTAL, CIVIC OR CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES.
(3) A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee or non-legal advisor
of an organization ...devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal
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generally authorizes a judge to "speak, write, lecture, teach and
participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the
legal system, the administration of justice and non-legal subjects."
Canon 4(H)(1) generally authorizes a judge to "receive compensa-
tion and reimbursement of expenses for the extra-judicial activities
permitted by this Code, if the source of such payments does not
give the appearance of influencing the judge's performance of judi-
system or the administration of justice or of an educational ... organization
not conducted for profit, [subject to other Code provisions and specified lim-
itations, such as that the organization may not be engaged in proceedings or
likely proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or the
judge's court, and that the judge is restricted from participating in fund-rais-
ing or solicitation of members] ....
D. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES.
(1) A judge shall not engage in financial and business dealings that:
(a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge's judicial
position...
(5) A judge shall not accept.., a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone
except for:
(a) ... books, tapes and other resource materials supplied by publishers
on a complimentary basis for official use, or an invitation to the judge and
the judge's spouse or guest to attend a bar-related function or an activity
devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administra-
tion of justice;
(c) ordinary social hospitality;
(g) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and based on
the same criteria applied to other applicants; or
(h) any other gift, bequest, favor or loan, only if: the donor is not a party
or other person who has come or is likely to come or whose interests have
come or are likely to come before the judge; and, if its value exceeds
$150.00, the judge reports it in the same manner as the judge reports com-
pensation under Section 4H.
H. COMPENSATION, REIMBURSEMENT AND REPORTING.
(1) COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT. A judge may receive
compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the extra-judicial activities
permitted by this Code, if the source of such payments does not give the
appearance of influencing the judge's performance of judicial duties or oth-
erwise give the appearance of impropriety.
(a) Compensation shall not exceed a reasonable amount nor shall it ex-
ceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.
(b) Expense reimbursement shall be limited to the actual cost of travel,
food and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate
to the occasion, by the judge's spouse or guest. Any payment in excess of
such an amount is compensation.
(2) PUBLIC REPORTS. A judge shall report the date, place and nature
of any activity for which the judge received compensation, and the name of
the payor and the amount of compensation so received ....
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cial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety." Ca-
non 4(D)(5)(g) specifically authorizes a judge to accept "a
scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and based on
the same criteria applied to other applicants." Canon 4(D)(5)(h)
permits a judge, subject to a reporting requirement, to accept "any
other gift, bequest, favor or loan ... if... the donor is not a party
or other person who has come or is likely to come or whose inter-
ests have come or are likely to come before the judge. ' 59 Conduct
authorized by these provisions is subject to the general admonition
that judges must conduct their "extra-judicial activities so that they
do not . . . cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act
impartially as a judge; ... demean the judicial office; or ... inter-
fere with the proper performance of judicial duties. 60
To the extent that the judicial codes require interpretation, gui-
dance is offered by various judicial bodies and bar association com-
mittees that issue advisory opinions, typically in response to
inquiries from judges. Among these are the Advisory Committee
on Codes of Conduct of the United States Judicial Conference,
which gives advice to federal judges. To a large extent, however,
within the framework of the applicable judicial code, questions are
left to individual judges' discretion.61
B. The Judiciary's Perspective on Privately-Funded Seminars
Individual judges have discretion to conclude that, to avoid "the
appearance of impropriety ' 62 or for other reasons, they should not
attend privately-supported judicial seminars in science, the envi-
ronment, or law-and-economics. However, over the past two de-
cades, judicial organizations and a significant number of individual
judges have seemingly concluded that applicable law and judicial
codes do not forbid judges from attending.63 Hundreds of judges
59. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
60. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(A) (1990).
61. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1306
(1974) (answering the question of whether a judge may preside in a case in which a
party is represented by a lawyer of the judge's former law firm: "The decision is the
judge's to make, not the attorney's .... 'In the final analysis it must be left to the
good judgment and conscience of the individual judge"'); Supreme Court of Ohio,
Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 95-4 (Apr. 7, 1995) (answering the
question whether to occasionally accept books from a publisher that does business in
the court: "Justices and judges must use their discretion."). See generally Irving R.
Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1970).
62. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(H)(1)(1990).
63. Ethics of Judicial Education, supra note 1, at 10.
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have participated in these privately-supported seminars. Judicial
advisory bodies, while aware of objections to judges' participation,
have not cautioned judges against doing so.
The popularity of the judicial seminars is significant because for
the most part, judges regulate their own conduct. At the federal
level and in the large majority of states, official organizations inter-
pret the judicial codes with the objective of providing guidance to
judges.6 4 These organizations are unquestionably aware of pri-
vately funded judicial education and its popularity with judges.
There are no reports of any judicial body having prohibited judges
from attending private seminars. Individual judges also have a per-
sonal responsibility to apply ethics provisions to their own conduct.
Many have indicated by participating in judicial seminars that they
see no legal or ethical impediment to doing so.
The law-and-economics programs have existed since at least
1974, when the Law and Economics Center was founded by Henry
G. Manne.65 The existence of these judicial education programs
and their corporate and foundation sponsorship has been public
knowledge for decades.66 In August 1980, shortly after criticisms
were first raised in the media-and, reportedly, in Congress67-the
United States Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Codes
of Conduct issued Advisory Opinion 67.68 The specific question
presented was "whether judges may with propriety attend seminars
and similar educational activities organized by non-governmental
entities and may have the expenses of their attendance paid by
such entities. 69 The committee concluded that judges may do so.
It reasoned that "Payment of tuition and expenses involved in at-
tendance at non-government sponsored seminars" is a gift that
judges are specifically authorized to accept under provisions of the
federal judicial code (corresponding to current Canons 4(D)(5)(g)
and (h) of the ABA Code), which permit judges to accept a fellow-
ship or scholarship "awarded on the same terms applied . . . to
other applicants," or to accept any other gift "so long as the donor
64. See, e.g., infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
65. For a description of the three major sponsors of judicial education programs
see CrrY. RIGHTS COUNSEL, supra note 11, at 11-17; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 1-7
66. Supra note 7.
67. Supra note 8.
68. U.S. Judicial Conference, Advisory Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory
Op. 67 (revised 1998).
69. Id.
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is not a party in litigation before, and its interests are not likely to
come before, the invited judge."7 ° The opinion explained:
The education of judges in various academic disciplines serves
the public interest. That a lecture or seminar may emphasize a
particular viewpoint or school of thought does not in itself pre-
clude a judge from attending. Judges are continually exposed to
competing views and are trained to weigh them.71
The opinion noted the following limitation, however:
It would be improper to participate in such a seminar if the
sponsor, or source of funding, is involved in litigation, or likely
to be so involved, and the topics to be covered in the seminar
are likely to be in some manner related to the subject matter of
such litigation.72
The opinion further stated that judges have an individual respon-
sibility to satisfy themselves that their participation would be
permissible:
If there is a reasonable question concerning the propriety of
participation, the judge should take such measures as may be
necessary to satisfy himself or herself that there is no impropri-
ety. To the extent that this involves obtaining further informa-
tion from the sponsors of the seminar, the judge should make
clear an intent to make the information public if any question
should arise concerning the propriety of the judge's
attendance.73
Finally, the opinion concluded that "Judges who accepted invita-
tions to participate in such seminars, having been satisfied that no
impropriety or appearance thereof is present, must report the re-
imbursement of expenses and the value of the gift on their financial
disclosure reports. 74
Advisory Opinion 67 did not necessarily compel the conclusion
that judges may attend law-and-economics seminars, although it
did place the burden on judges to resolve for themselves questions
about the propriety of participating.75 Although the Advisory
Committee may well have had the LEC's programs in mind, the
opinion did not refer to the law-and-economics seminars or any
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. U.S. Judicial Conference, Advisory Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory
Op. 67 (1998) [hereinafter Adv. Op. 67].
75. Id.
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other particular seminar. Further, while the opinion reasoned that
a program's lack of balance (i.e., "[t]hat a lecture or seminar may
emphasize a particular viewpoint or school of thought") 76 "does
not in itself preclude a judge from attending, ' 77 the opinion did not
foreclose an argument that other aspects of a program, such as the
lavishness of the setting where the seminar was conducted, com-
bined with the imbalanced nature of instruction, might preclude
judges' participation. Further, the opinion did not foreclose an ar-
gument that judges should not participate because the seminars are
funded by corporations, or by foundations affiliated with corpora-
tions, that may become parties in litigation involving law-and-eco-
nomics issues like those addressed in the seminars. Nonetheless,
subsequent events made clear that the Advisory Opinion meant
generally to permit federal judges to participate in programs such
as those of LEC.
Days after Advisory Opinion 67 was issued, the Institute for
Public Representation petitioned the United States Judicial Con-
ference to provide further guidance. 71 The petition specifically ad-
dressed the programs of the Law and Economics Center, then
located at the University of Miami Law School.79 By that time,
approximately 145 federal judges had reportedly attended these
programs.80 The United States Judicial Conference declined to re-
view the LEC's judicial seminars in detail or to adopt guidelines for
judicial participation in privately-funded programs. According to
the Alliance for Justice, Judge Howard Markey, who then chaired
the Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct, responded to the
petition by citing Advisory Opinion 67 and noting that the "advice
in Opinion 67 that judges invited to educational seminars inform
themselves is deemed fully adequate."81 Reportedly, at around the
same time, the Advisory Committee's private advice to individual
judges was that participation in LEC's programs was permissible.82
Public concerns were renewed in 1993 when the Alliance for Jus-
tice issued a report criticizing judges' attendance at law-and-eco-
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. See IPR Petition, supra note 9, at 19; see also ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra
note 10.
79. IPR Petition, supra note 9, at 19.
80. Id.
81. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 74.
82. See Barbash, supra note 7, at A3 ("D.C. District Court Judge June Green ...
said she was aware of the corporate sponsorship but sought and received approval of
the U.S. judges' ethics committee before attending [an LEC program].")
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nomics programs.83 The following year, United States District
Judge Jack B. Weinstein addressed this report in a twenty-six page
law review article-the first in a three-part series-dealing in depth
with the question of how judges learn.84 The article specifically re-
viewed criticisms of judicial education programs of the Law and
Economics Center (now located at the George Mason University
School of Law) 85 as well as criticisms directed at conferences at
Yale Law School and New York University Law School exclusively
sponsored by Aetna Casualty and Life. 6 The criticisms directed at
the LEC programs charged that the programs were ideologically
biased toward advancing corporations' financial interests87 and that
judges were enticed by the resort locations to take the courses. 88
Although Judge Weinstein suggested ways of reducing concerns
about the bias of judicial education programs, 89 he generally dis-
missed the Alliance's criticisms as unsound. 90 He took the view
83. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 71-75.
84. Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting-
Part I-Tentative First Thoughts: How Many Judges Learn, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 539
(1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn]; see also Hon. Jack B. Wein-
stein, Learning, Speaking, and Acting: What Are the Limits for Judges?, 77 JUDICA-
TURE 322 (1994); Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning, Speaking, and
Acting: Part II Speaking and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (1994).
85. Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84, at 546-52.
86. Id. at 545-46.
87. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 72-74.
88. Id. at 72.
89. Among other things, Judge Weinstein suggested that educational institutions
sponsoring judicial seminars "should make every effort to use general university funds
or obtain funding from a sufficiently broad spectrum of donors so that the suspicion
of bias is minimized." Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84, at 546.
Judge Weinstein also suggested that rather than allowing a corporate sponsor to pay
for the judge's expenses (as in the case of the Yale and N.Y.U. programs), the law
school or the federal Administrative Office or Judicial Center should fund the pro-
grams. Id. In Judge Weinstein's judgment, funding from groups that frequently liti-
gate was more suspicious than funding supplied by private, non-corporate
foundations, which seldom participate in litigation and have little to gain from judicial
decisions. Id. at 547. Judge Weinstein also argued that joint sponsorship of judicial
seminars by educational and judicial institutions should be encouraged and, if suffi-
cient funding was available, "it would be best to have much of the training paid for by
the most neutral source of all-the government." Id. at 548. Judge Weinstein wrote
that "Providing comfortable settings for education may be objectionable if carried to
an extreme, since the public believes it pays [judges] enough and perks are resented
by taxpayers." Id. at 550. Judge Weinstein also felt that judges certainly should be
able to rely on the sponsor of the program to disclose biases in the presentations, id.
at 553, and that judicial seminars should be publicized and, if non-public, "a record of
attendance should be kept with the clerk of the court, should inquiry be made." Id. at
556.
90. Id. at 547. Judge Weinstein took the view that "The fact that sponsorship is by
an accredited law school provides the judge with a buffer and assurance of impartial-
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that ordinarily "[j]udges should be encouraged to gain as much
general knowledge as possible, preferably from sources not tainted
by venal or extreme ideological views."91 Although the Alliance
charged that LEC presented biased programs, Judge Weinstein
concluded that judges should not be deterred from attending con-
ferences espousing a certain viewpoint and noted that "[m]ature
and experienced judges' thoughts can seldom be rechanneled by an
instructor's bias."'9 2 Nor did he agree that the programs necessarily
should be held at less lavish settings.93 Other federal judges, al-
though not at such length, have also publicly expressed the view
that attendance at the various judicial seminars in law and econom-
ics is permissible.94
More recently, questions were directed to the federal judiciary
during committee hearings of the House of Representatives on
June 11, 1998.9s At the hearings, Representative Zoe Lofgren
raised a question about federal judges' attendance at all-expense-
paid seminars and observed that the federal judiciary, as an entity,
ought to provide some guidance. 96 In response, District Judge Wil-
liam Terrell Hodges noted that opinions of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Codes of Conduct already dealt with the question.97
Additionally, Judge Hodges indicated that he would ask the com-
mittee to reexamine the question.98 A month later, on July 10,
1998, the committee issued a slightly revised Opinion 67 which ad-
hered to the earlier conclusion.99
ity" and that the "criticism of the lush settings for the courses is not ... entitled to
much weight" because, given the amount of work, "these courses can hardly be char-
acterized as jaunts." Id. at 548.
91. Id. at 565.
92. Id. at 552.
93. Id. at 550.
94. See, e.g., Perception of a Conflict, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 1998 ("[U.S.
District Judge Gene] Carter defended his attendance [at a FREE seminar] by arguing
that judges needed 'all the training and education they can get in areas like science,
economics and technology in today's world of increasingly complex litigation."')
95. Oversight Hearings on the United States Judicial Conference, Administrative
Office, And Federal Judicial Center, Protecting Small Business Act of 1998: Hearing on
H.R. 3578 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Comm. of the Judiciary and Intellec-
tual Property of the House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Over-
sight Hearing] (on file with the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL).
96. Id. at 33.
97. Id. at 34.
98. Id. at 37.
99. U.S. Judicial Conference, Advisory Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 67
(1998).
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At the state level, there is awareness of the judicial seminars, but
no advisory opinion precludes state judges' attendance." ° On the
contrary, there are indications that representative bodies have con-
sidered the question and either approved judges' attendance or, in
the very least, affirmatively decided not to disapprove it.10 1 Ac-
cording to Henry Butler, the Director of LOEC at University of
Kansas, the Conference of Chief Justices approved his programs.10 2
Likewise, the then-president-elect of the American Judges Associ-
ation reportedly stated that, as a rule, state judges' attendance at
judicial seminars is permissible. 1°3
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that, from judges' per-
spective, attendance at privately funded judicial education pro-
grams is not legally or ethically proscribed is the continued
popularity of these programs with a wide segment of the state and
federal judiciary. As of late 1999, more than 500 federal judges
and 450 state judges had attended a program sponsored by one of
100. This Article reflects a review of relevant judicial ethics advisory opinions from
some twenty states: California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
101. Ethics of Judicial Education, supra note 1, at 13.
102. Henry N. Butler, Judges' Economics Classes Not Improper, WICHITA EAGLE,
Aug. 12, 1999, at A6.
The funding sources for [LOEC's] programs have been reviewed by the
Conference of Chief Justices. I had cleared the funding sources of the pro-
gram with Chief Justice Ellen Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court
(who at the time was serving as chair of the Conference of Chief Justices)
prior to holding our first institute in December 1995. Indeed, Chief Justice
Peters told me that there were no objections to the funding sources when she
raised the issue at a meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices in summer
1995.
Id.
103. Dion Lefler & Robert Short, Big Business Pays for Judges' Classes, WICHITA
EAGLE, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1.
Judge Gerald Elliott of Olathe, president-elect of the American Judges As-
sociation, said canons of judicial ethics prohibit judges from participating in
any activities that could create an "appearance of impropriety."
Elliott said he doesn't think attending the [University of Kansas Econom-
ics Institutes for State Judges] is a violation of that canon because the pro-
gram is sponsored by the university and has been approved by the Bar
Association for credit in continuing legal education.
"You've got a program run by the University of Kansas," Elliott said.
"State judges ought to be able to look at that with a fairly clear eye and
think that it is a fair program."
But, he said, judges should be wary of the possibility of hearing cases in-
volving companies that provide major funding.
"You might want to know who are the contributors to that," he said. "You
might want to at least think about recusing yourself in a given case."
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the three private educational institutions that sponsor ongoing ju-
dicial seminars. Many judges have attended more than one pro-
gram.10 n To be sure, many judges have passed up the opportunity
to participate in these programs, perhaps to avoid an appearance of
impropriety. As noted, judges are entirely free to reach this con-
clusion as a matter of individual discretion.
Whether a judge, once having attended a private judicial semi-
nar, is restricted in the ability to hear cases on which the seminars
had some bearing, is a different matter. Recently, the Second Cir-
cuit became the first court to examine this question in depth. The
decision, In re Aguinda, °5 arose from a civil lawsuit brought
against Texaco by citizens of Ecuador and Peru. The plaintiffs
claimed that Texaco's pollution had caused environmental damage
and personal injuries in their countries. The district judge initially
dismissed the lawsuit and, while the decision was on appeal, at-
tended an expenses-paid seminar conducted by FREE on environ-
mental issues."0 6 Texaco was a contributor to FREE and a former
Texaco executive officer spoke at the seminar. 107 After the court of
appeals remanded the lawsuit back to the district court, the plain-
tiffs argued that the district judge should be disqualified from con-
tinuing to preside over the environmental litigation. 108 The judge
concluded that he was not required to disqualify himself, and the
court of appeals agreed. 0 9
The Second Circuit addressed the plaintiffs' arguments at consid-
erable length. First, examining Texaco's minor contribution to
FREE's general funding,"0 the court concluded that a reasonable
observer would regard the donation as "too remote to create a
plausible suspicion of improper influence.""' The court compared
a judge's attendance at a FREE seminar to a judge's attendance at
expenses-paid programs sponsored by bar associations and law
schools. The court observed that no reasonable person would ex-
pect a judge who attended such programs to favor a party that was
a minor donor to the law schools or bar associations serving as
sponsors.112
104. See Ethics of Judicial Education, supra note 1, at app. B, at 11.
105. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2000).
106. Id. at 197-98.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 198.
110. Id. at 202.
111. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d at 202-03.
112. Id. at 203.
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Additionally, the Second Circuit assumed for the sake of argu-
ment that the particular environmental seminar attended by the
district judge made an unbalanced presentation on policy issues.
As a general rule, the court held that the judge could nevertheless
preside over environmental litigation.' 13 The court reasoned that
even if the seminar persuaded the judge that environmental laws
are harmful, it would be presumed that the judge would put aside
his personal beliefs and carry out the law.114 Further, it noted that
judges have many encounters with writings and talks pertinent to
their cases, and inquiry into how those encounters influence their
views would be impractical. n
The Second Circuit saw no meaningful difference between at-
tending an expenses-paid seminar sponsored by FREE and attend-
ing any other presentation on a debated issue' 16 sponsored by an
organization that receives funding, even if minor or remote, from a
party or its attorney.'1 7 Therefore, the court suggested, if attend-
ance at the FREE seminar was thought to create an impermissible
appearance of partiality, judges would have to stop attending simi-
lar seminars in order to avoid being disqualified from hearing fu-
ture cases related to such seminar's subject matter.' 8
The Second Circuit identified particular circumstances, however,
where attending an expenses-paid seminar might bar a judge from
later participating in a case. The first is when a party or its lawyer
contributes "a significant portion of [the sponsoring organization's]
general funding.""' 9 Whether a contribution was "significant"
must be determined on a case-by-case basis; the court's point was
that the contribution raises concerns when a judge accepts "some-
thing of value from an organization whose existence is arguably
dependent upon a party to litigation"' 2 ° or its counsel.
Disqualification might also be required, the appellate court said,
when the judge attended a presentation concerning legal issues ma-
terial to a claim's disposition or defense in the particular lawsuit or
involving parties, witnesses or counsel in particular actions. 12 1 The
court was unable to say with precision when there was a close
113. Id. at 203-04.
114. Id. at 204.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 205.
117. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d at 205.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 206.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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enough match between the legal issues discussed at an educational
seminar and those in the lawsuit to require disqualification. The
court did note, however, that when parties or their lawyers fund
seminars that bear too closely on a litigation in which they are in-
volved, "the appearance created bears too great a resemblance to
an ex parte contact.' ' 22
The court concluded by taking a swipe at CRC, whose July 2000
report had provided the underpinnings of the plaintiffs' disqualifi-
cation motion. The court noted that the plaintiffs sought to "bene-
fit from CRC's rather ample access to the media, ' 123 and observed
that the question whether conduct gives rise to an appearance of
impartiality must be judged "based on the facts of the presentation
involved and not on the amount of publicity partisans on the par-
ticular issues can muster." From the perspective of Henry G.
Manne, the self-described "Johnny Appleseed of the Law and Eco-
nomics movement" 124 who had established LEC more than twenty-
five years earlier, the Second Circuit's decision had "so thoroughly
answered the specific objections" to the judicial seminars that the
"whole topic" of judicial education "would seem to be controver-
sial only to whatever new group of intellectual Luddites is
threatened by ideas they find inhospitable. 1 25
II. THE JUDICIARY'S DETERMINATION ACCORDS WITH THE
APPLICABLE RESTRICTIONS
Critics might be skeptical of judicial expressions of approval for
judicial seminars for several reasons. It might be argued that the
judiciary's approval is not sufficiently explicit or thought out; that it
proceeds from the erroneous belief that the judicial seminars are
more balanced than they are; that it is otherwise based on an in-
complete or erroneous understanding of how the programs oper-
ate; or that judges have been led astray out of a self-interested
desire to attend these programs. However, as discussed below, the
judiciary's approval of privately funded education is consistent
with existing regulatory provisions.
The applicable law (e.g., disqualification statutes, restrictions on
government officials generally, and judicial ethics codes) may vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as may the courts' and other au-
122. Id.
123. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d at 206.
124. Henry G. Manne, Remarks for ABA Panel on Continuing Education for Fed-
eral Judges 3 (Aug. 5, 2001) (on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal).
125. Id. at 1.
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thorities' interpretations of that law. In some states, judges per-
haps should not participate in law-and-economics programs that
indirectly support judges' expenses with contributions from certain
corporations or foundations. Rather than comprehensively survey-
ing the law of every jurisdiction,126 this Article focuses on federal
law, the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (which serves
as a model for the federal judicial code as well as those of most
states),127 and certain state laws that serve as useful exemplars be-
cause they are interpreted by published judicial decisions and/or
advisory opinions.
Under the generally prevailing law, two questions might be
asked. First, even if their expenses are not paid or reimbursed, are
judges forbidden from attending the law-and-economics programs
because, for example, the programs are unbalanced or misleading
and might affect the judges' later decision making? Second, even if
judges' mere attendance would otherwise be permissible, are
judges forbidden from attending at no expense, or, having at-
tended, must they later recuse themselves in certain cases? As dis-
cussed below, the answer to both questions is reasonably clear.
Under prevailing law, there is no flat prohibition from participating
fully in expenses-paid educational programs-even those that re-
flect a particular perspective on certain legal questions-and there
is no ordinary requirement that, if they do participate, judges must
recuse themselves when a corporation affiliated with a contributor
to these programs is a party to an action.
A. Attendance
The judicial seminars offered by LEC, FREE, and LOEC are
not recorded and disseminated or otherwise open to the public.
There is therefore room for unresolvable disagreement about the
precise nature of the instruction and whether it is balanced. 28 The
organizers, as well as some judges who have been interviewed after
126. See supra note 100 for a summary of states surveyed.
127. Supra note 49.
128. The organizers of these programs might well be criticized for not making the
programs more "transparent"-for example, by recording them and making the re-
cord available to scholars and critics. Doing so might serve several salutary ends. It
would permit those with different perspectives to publicly critique the programs and
point out areas where, in their view, the programs are one-sided, misleading, or sim-
ply incorrect. Such critiques might enable judges to make a better informed decision
whether to attend the programs, cf Adv. Op. 67, supra note 74, and, if judges do
attend, such critiques might serve as a counterweight to instruction that critics con-
sider to be one-sided. On the other hand, there may be pedagogic considerations-
for example, judges may be reluctant to participate in discussions as openly if their
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attending, have denied that the instruction is misleading or unduly
slanted. However, based on what is known of the organizers'
views, the published curricula, the identity of the instructors, and
accounts of the seminars, critics have charged that the instruction is
unbalanced or biased. As noted earlier, this Article proceeds on
the assumption that the critics are correct. 129
This raises a concern about judges' attendance at the judicial
seminars wholly independent of the financial arrangement (i.e.,
that judges attend for free and that their travel, lodging, and meals
are subsidized). Even if judges were willing to pay their own way,
one might argue they should not attend. The concern is that, by
attending educational programs relating to the law, judges expose
themselves to individuals with particular views of the law and sub-
ject themselves to possible influences that may later affect how
they approach litigation. This concern might be raised, of course,
even where an educational program makes every effort to be bal-
anced, since an expression of all conceivable viewpoints may be
impossible to achieve and since some presenters may be more per-
suasive than others for reasons (such as the quality of their presen-
tation) that are unrelated to the quality of their ideas. But the
possibility that judges' thinking will be influenced outside the
courtroom is more worrisome where the educational program is
slanted in favor of a particular legal philosophy. Thus, it might be
argued, judges should confine their education to the courtroom,
where the presentation of legal arguments is public and opposing
sides have an equal opportunity to present their views. Or, in the
very least, judges should confine their extrajudicial legal education
to balanced presentations.
In response to this concern, various answers might be offered
with respect to the judicial seminars supported by the LEC, FREE,
and LOEC, or with respect to judicial education generally. It
might be argued, for example, that judges are sophisticated stu-
dents who are not easily susceptible to misleading influences; 130
that judges should be able to rely on the reputation and integrity of
questions and comments are recorded-that might suggest that greater openness
should be sought by other means.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
130. See Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84, at 552. Judge Wein-
stein made this point in the context of law-and-economics seminars. One might re-
spond, however, that judges are not particularly well versed in economics or the
sciences, which is precisely why they need education in these areas. Therefore, partic-
ularly without assistance, judges will not be well qualified to distinguish between bal-
anced instruction and slanted or misleading instruction in these subjects.
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the educational institution offering the program to ensure that it is
not excessively biased or misleading;' that judges should be able
to rely on the judgment of previous attendees that the programs
are educational and not unduly slanted;132 that judges can obtain
"balanced" instruction by attending several programs no one of
which is "balanced;"'1 33 or that confining judges to "balanced" pro-
grams would essentially deny judges the opportunity to engage in
extrajudicial education at all, because all programs are to some de-
gree imbalanced, because, to be effective, a presentation must pro-
mote a particular perspective,3 or because a judge can never
know in advance whether and to what extent a program will be
balanced.
However one comes out on this question as a matter of judicial
policy, the law is clear that, as a general rule, judges are free to
educate themselves outside the courtroom, and the limited restric-
tions that exist would not foreclose judges from attending judicial
seminars in law and economics, even "biased" ones. This reflects a
reasonable judgment that the value of ongoing judicial education
far outweighs the risk that judges will be unduly influenced by bi-
ased or misleading instruction.
The relevant provisions reflect two general principles. The first
is that judges may have views, including views on the law. 135
131. See id. at 548.
132. See, e.g., Barbash, supra note 7 at A3 ("[U.S. District Judge Samuel] Conti said
that, 'If I thought I was being brainwashed, I'd say forget it. I go to a lot of other
judges' meetings and don't go back because they're boring. Not this one."'); Beck-
with, supra note 7 (quoting Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal: "They are definitely free-
market oriented .... But they're careful to give you access to several points of view. I
get the impression they're trying to expose judges to the fact that there is a point of
view on the other side, but they don't say the other side is necessarily correct .... In
the instruction, it's implicit that the Chicago point of view is widely misunderstood...
and that people should be aware of it. But I was aware when I came down here that
this could be a steering operation. And if I'm being steered, I'm not aware of it."); id.
(quoting Circuit Judge Malcolm Wilkey: "It hasn't been a snow job .... We judges
often find that economic arguments are advanced by some counsel with a high degree
of confidence. This knowledge will help us calculate the real probability of those
arguments being true."); see also Henry N. Butler, Judges' Economics Classes Not
Improper, WICHITA EAGLE, Aug. 12, 1999, at A6 ("[W]hat we teach is positive eco-
nomics, and it can only help in making better decisions within any ideology"); id.
("Those who claim that teaching economics is biased or partisan don't understand
economics enough to be taken seriously.").
133. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 95, at 37 (remarks of Rep. Frank).
134. Id. at 36 (remarks of Rep. Frank).
135. Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Commentary on Jeffrey M. Shaman's The Impar-
tial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 638 (1996).
It is one thing to ask that judges be detached in the sense that they must
place their allegiance to the rule of law and the judicial institution above
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Judges are not blank slates. Thus, judges may possess, and develop
over time, general opinions about legal and policy questions and
are free to decide cases on which those opinions may have some
bearing. 136 Indeed, when deciding cases, judges are expected to
draw on their views of the law.137 As Chief Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained in a speech to the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York:
[One dictionary definition of "bias"] is "an inclination of tem-
perament or outlook." In that broad definition of "bias," one
can scarcely escape the conclusion that all judges, to a greater or
lesser extent, are biased .... The late Justice Black was, in this
sense of the word, "biased" in favor of a literal construction of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
made no bones about saying so. But it cannot be this sort of
"bias" which would disqualify a judge, else it would be the rare
case in which a quorum of a court could be mustered for
decision.
I would suggest that the true distinction is between the concept
of attitude or outlook, which is not disqualifying, and the con-
cept of "favoritism," which is disqualifying. Favoritism to me
means a tendency or inclination to treat a particular litigant
more or less generously than a different litigant raising the iden-
tical issue. 138
To like effect, a commentator has reasoned that
Disqualifying a judge because of his general legal philosophy or
point of view is clearly impractical and nonsensical. All judges
have acquired predispositions and philosophies that affect their
behavior, on and off the bench. Such predispositions should not
their personal considerations or predilections. However, if by calling the
ideal judge "detached" we mean that such a judge is both disengaged and
disinterested, without interests or points of view, without preferences or bi-
ases, we are not only speaking of a different sort of detachment, but we are
also erecting an ideal which is clearly unattainable.
Id.
136. See, e.g., Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1171 n.51 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Litteneker, supra note 38, at 252 ("[A] consistent and predictable judicial phi-
losophy demands that a judge have certain preconceptions on matters of legal princi-
ple, even though they may disadvantage a party.").
137. According to Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals:
"[T]he danger is not that judges will bring the full measure of their experience, their
moral core, their every human capacity to bear in the difficult process of resolving
cases before them. It seems to me that a far greater danger exists if they do not."
Hon. Judith S. Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection
on a Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1015 (1988).
138. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Stuff and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 REC.
Ass'N BAR Crrv N.Y. 694, 709 (1973).
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be ground for disqualification. As one commentator stated:
"[I]nsofar as a judge has developed a consistent philosophy, he
might be said to have prejudged the legal issues involved in a
particular case. Arguably, under these circumstances his impar-
tiality reasonably could be questioned ... [but disqualification
for this reason] would preclude consistent judicial and rational
functioning by the judiciary."
That judges have developed legal philosophies and opinions is
accepted and inherent in the judicial system. Indeed, those
nominated to become federal judges often are chosen precisely
because they are believed to have certain legal philosophies and
outlooks. Once a judge is in office, it is expected, and in fact
desired, that he will develop an individual outlook and point of
view, a general judicial philosophy. 39
When the Code of Judicial Conduct was revised in the early
1970s, the drafters "recognized the necessity and value of judges
having fixed beliefs about constitutional principles and many other
facets of the law."140 When it adopted a provision requiring judges
to disqualify themselves for personal bias or prejudice,' 4 ' the com-
mittee specifically intended to exclude situations in which the judge
had "a fixed belief about the law applicable to a case."' 42 This
Code provision is the model on which the current federal disquali-
fication statute and many state statutes are based.
The second general principle is that judges may, and should, en-
gage in extrajudicial activities relating to the law, including educa-
tional activities, 1  although such involvement may influence their
understandings of the law. When the Code of Judicial Conduct was
amended in 1972, one commentator made the following
observation:
On the whole [the Code] does not assume or try to prescribe a
cloistered judicial role; indeed, to the extent that it encourages a
judge to engage in a variety of activities and not recede into
monastic contemplation it recognizes that the business of judg-
139. Bloom, supra note 38, at 683 (quoting Note, Disqualification of Judges and
Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 757 (1973)).
140. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 61
(1973).
141. The current provision is Canon 3E(1)(a) of the MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (1990).
142. Bloom, supra note 38, at 691.
143. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 135, at 646-47; John E. Cribbet, The Public
Activities of a Judge, 51 CHI. B. REC. 78, 81 (1969) ("Judges should not be removed
from the mainstream of life .... Obviously, [a judge] should be allowed, if not actu-
ally encouraged, to participate in the activities of the organized bench and bar and of
legal education.").
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ing is more than the mere application of precedents and requires
more than merely being "learned" in the law....
To strictly prohibit judges from all extra-judicial activity, as
many have suggested, would be counterproductive; the small
possible net gain in diminished conflicts of interest would be
outweighed by the resulting losses in judicial vision and inde-
pendence of thought. Judicial independence is a value worth
supporting if it implies and creates the conditions under which
judges can offer a fresh, enriched, and informed view of solu-
tions to society's problems. It is not worth supporting if it
means only that judges are to be artificially and excessively iso-
lated. As Judge Irving Kaufman has noted, "the increasingly
complex and sensitive issues our society leaves to be settled by
litigation" leave little room for encouragement of judicial myo-
pia. The biases of ignorance and parochialism seem to me, on
the whole, more difficult to combat than economic partiality.144
Similarly, Robert B. McKay, then dean of New York University
School of Law, described the importance of non-judicial activities
as follows:
It would be easy, but intellectually lazy, to hold that the sole
business of judges is judging, that all else is at least distracting,
and that accordingly a judge should avoid all nonjudicial activi-
ties that might either be time-consuming or influence his opin-
ion on matters that come before him. The argument proves too
much. If a judge is to live in this world and not in the isolation
of a sequestered juror, he is constantly shaping his views on all
kinds of matters that may come before him. The perceptions of
a judge are influenced by conversations with family, friends, and
colleagues; by his choices among the competing news media; his
144. Joel B. Grossman, A Political View of Judicial Ethics, 9 SAN DIEGo L. REV.
803, 808-09 (1972) (quoting Hon. Irving R. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function
of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 7 (1970)). Professor
Grossman went on to propose that the Code contain a provision that would affirma-
tively encourage judges to educate themselves broadly:
I would add: "Consistent with the above a judge should seek, as widely as
time and resources permit and from any source, to obtain facts and opinions
which may enhance his ability to decide a case justly." This does not imply
that a judge should seek third-party accounts of the facts of a particular case.
It does seek to encourage judges to decide or conduct cases with the
broadest possible background of general information. There are many
judges, on high courts and lower courts, who have amply demonstrated this
commitment to horizon broadening .... Hopefully [this admonition] would
inspire some additional increment of judges to escape from the narrow intel-
lectual confines of their chambers.
Id. at 815.
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preferences in recreational activities; and even his tastes in
clothes and hair styles (the long and short of it).
Skeptics may well charge overkill at this point, for of course no
one suggests that judges cut themselves off from family, friends,
and colleagues. But anything short of that impossible dream is
unlikely to accomplish the objectives of those who seek immuni-
zation of the judiciary from all the opinion-shaping forces that
surround them. It is at least arguable-and I for one would so
argue-that a judge is likely to be a better dispenser of justice if
he is aware of the currents and passions of the time, the devel-
opments of technology, and the sweep of events. To judge in the
real world a judge must live, breathe, think, and partake of opin-
ions in the real world.145
The Code of Judicial Conduct embodies this general principle as
well. 46 It discourages judges from being cloistered: 147 "A judge
may speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other extra-judi-
145. Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 25 LAw & CON.
TEMP. PROB. 9, 12 (1970).
Nonjudicial activities, whether quasi-judicial or extra-judicial in nature,
should not be allowed if there is a substantial likelihood that the undertaking
will
1. interfere with the performance of official duty;
2. interfere, or seem to interfere, with the impartiality of the participating
judge; or
3. impair the dignity and prestige of the judicial office.
Where these hazards are not involved, there are reasons to permit, even to
encourage, nonjudicial activities if their performance will
1. help to prevent judicial shortsightedness arising from loss of contact with
the world outside the court;
2. continue the education and development of essential skills in law and ju-
dicial administration; or
3. enrich and educate the audiences to which the judge lecture, writes or
teaches.
Id. at 19-20; Charles D. Breitel, Ethical Problems in the Performance of the Judicial
Function, in JUDICIAL ETHICs 64, 80 (1964) ("If law were simple, if judges merely
applied law like so many black-letter principles and rules, and if the determination of
facts was a simple process, . . . then perhaps, the judge isolated from all controversial
aspects of community life would be the ideal. The ivory tower would be the true
symbol. But law is not simple. The determination of facts is not simple. A judge
without contact, continuing substantial contact, with the community in which he is a
judge is not a good modern judge."); Steven Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives,
79 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 989 (1984-85) ("Not only is it impossible to isolate a judge
from opinion-shaping forces, it is undesirable to give the impression that this has been
accomplished .... Similarly, judges' knowledge of the public is essential to the dis-
pensation of justice .... [T]he impulse to protect judges from adverse influences by
cutting them off from the life of the community is not only 'intellectually lazy,' but is
also self-defeating.")
146. See McKay, supra note 145, at 20-21. These views were shared by then Circuit
Judge Irving R. Kaufman, a member of the Special Committee on Judicial Conduct
that drafted the 1972 code:
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cial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administra-
tion of justice and non-legal subjects."' 48 Advisory opinions
Once on the bench, we are accustomed to expect from our judges a breadth
of vision that comports with their independent status; and I think it not
merely happenstance that it has been men with diverse interests and back-
grounds that have, as a general proposition, met that test. Edmund Burke is
supposed to have said, "Law sharpens the mind by narrowing it." It seems
to me that the words were meant less in praise of the profession than in
warning to it. Judges run the risk of becoming oracles who speak of lectures
delivered ten, twenty, or thirty years ago, adequate for their time but not for
ours. To the extent that the judicial profession becomes the daily routine of
deciding cases on the most secure precedents and the narrowest grounds
available, the judicial mind atrophies, and its perspective shrinks ....
Hence I think that much can be said in favor of the position that we ought
to encourage, rather than discourage, judicial activities that exceed the four
corners of cases presented for disposition. There can be few qualities more
conducive to continue judicial independence than the breadth of vision ac-
quired in differing endeavors to advance law and justice.
One can take the position that since judicial tasks might be slighted, quasi-
judicial and extra-judicial activities should be abandoned altogether, espe-
cially since drafting a specific rule permitting some quasi-judicial activities
seems virtually impossible. Yet this would, I submit, be the worst of all pos-
sible worlds, for it would place a premium on judicial myopia in an age that
incessantly demands more independence and more understanding to solve
the increasingly complex and sensitive issues our society leaves to be settled
by litigation.
Kaufman, supra note 61, at 4-5, 7.
147. See, e.g., Ark. Jud. Advisory Op. 97-02 (Apr. 25, 1997) ("Complete separation
of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not
become isolated from the community in which the judge lives.") (quoting ARKANSAS
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 cmt.).
148. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(B) (1990). A knowledgeable
observer has commented:
The line between appropriate quasi-judicial activities and those that are
likely to lead to a judge's disqualification is not as difficult to draw as may
first appear. For example, a judge may write or lecture on a legal issue,
analyzing the present law and its history, its virtues and its shortcomings; he
may commend the present law or propose legal reform without compromis-
ing his capacity to decide impartially the very issue on which he has spoken
or written. There is a significant difference between the statement, "I will
grant all divorce actions that come before me-whatever the strength of the
evidence to support the statutory ground for divorce-because I believe that
persons who no longer live in harmony should be divorced," and the state-
ment, "I believe that limited statutory grounds for divorce are not in the
public interest. The law should be changed to allow persons who no longer
live in harmony to obtain a divorce." The latter does not compromise a
judge's capacity to apply impartially the law as written, although it clearly
states his position about improvements in the law.
The Committee recognized the need for judges to participate actively in
improving the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. This
Canon was designed to encourage those activities but also to provide a stan-
dard that protects the judge's essential function.
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confirm that judges may engage in activities, such as writing,14 9
teaching or lecturing,15° or participating in organizations to im-
prove the law,'151 notwithstanding that the judge's knowledge, phi-
THODE, supra note 140, at 74.
149. See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 99-14 (May 4, 1999) (advis-
ing that a judge may write a monthly newspaper column on the judicial system); Fla.
Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 93-52 (Sept. 7, 1993) (advising that a judge and
criminal defense lawyer may co-author a chapter for the state bar's continuing legal
education course); Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Disci-
pline, Op. 92-18 (Oct.16, 1992) (advising that a judge may receive compensation for
preparation of juvenile law handbook); Supreme Court of Ohio, Board of Comm'rs
on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 91-10 (Apr. 12, 1991) (advising that a judge may
receive compensation for preparation of educational materials for lawyers and non-
lawyers).
150. See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-14 (July 13, 1998) ("A
judge may speak, write, lecture, or teach the electorate at public forums about issues
concerning proposed constitutional amendments if they involve the law, the legal sys-
tem, and the administration of justice"); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-17 (June
17, 1994) (opining that judges may create a speakers' bureau and inform the public of
the judges' availability to speak on law-related issues); Ind. Judicial Nominating
Comm., Ind. Comm. on Judicial Qualifications, Advisory Op. 1-91 ("Judges, of
course, may speak, write, and lecture about the law, the legal system, and the adminis-
tration of justice .... In fact, judges are encouraged to contribute to the profession in
this manner. Furthermore, it is perfectly proper for a judge to profit financially from
this activity"); Supreme Court of Kan., Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-74
(Apr. 14, 1997) (opining that a judge may serve as a lecturer or panelist in a law firm
continuing legal education seminar on legal ethics); State Bar of Mich., Comm. on
Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. JI-99 (Mar. 15, 1995) (opining that a judge may teach a
law course at a private college or university); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 94-40 (Apr. 28,
1994) (opining that a full-time judge may accept a paid teaching position as an adjunct
professor of law at a school of law within the geographical boundaries of the judge's
court); Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op.
95-9 (Aug. 4, 1995) (opining that a judge may receive compensation for teaching con-
tinuing legal education classes or courses); see also THODE, supra note 140, at 75 (re-
porting survey results that showed "that more than one-half of the law schools whose
deans answered the questionnaire (45 out of 76) regularly use one or more full-time
judges as part-time law teachers or lecturers, that at least 87 appellate judges and 126
trial judges regularly teach or lecture in law schools, and that the deans of the employ-
ing schools believe that the judges contribute significantly to legal education.").
151. See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-26 (Nov. 10, 1998)
(opining that a judge may serve on a mayoral commission whose mission is to help
crime victims by "providing a forum for the community to develop and implement
programs in education, prevention and intervention"); Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm.,
Advisory Op. 98-13 (July 7, 1998) (advising that a judge may communicate with mem-
bers of the legislature on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the admin-
istration of justice, including by speaking and submitting proposed legislation);
Supreme Judicial Court [of Mass.], Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 95-1 (Jan. 10, 1995)
(opining that a judge may serve on the Board of Directors of the Crime and Justice
Foundation, a non-profit foundation that supports programs in juvenile justice, court
mediation, and truth in sentencing; however, recusal may be required if, for example,
a case before the judge challenged the validity of legislation that the organization
played a key role in enacting); State Bar of Mich., Comm. on Professional and Judicial
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losophy or general judicial propensities may change as a result.
Examples of judges' involvement in such activities are too numer-
ous to mention. Needless to say, judges not only may teach, they
may learn; they nay not only espouse their views of the law, they
may expose themselves to others' views.152
Circumstances where judges must refrain from attending educa-
tional programs or, having done so, must disqualify themselves
from presiding in a case, are extremely rare. For example, al-
though judges may hold a general opinion about a legal or social
matter relevant to a case, 53 a judge may not preside if the judge
has acquired from extrajudicial sources "prior personal knowledge
Ethics, Op. JI-67 (Mar. 30, 1993) (opining that a judge may sit as member of indepen-
dent law revision commission).
152. See, e.g., N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 91-75 (June 13, 1991) ("Traditionally, bar
associations and similar organizations have conducted seminars, forums and programs
to enhance legal professionalism and for which fees are charged. Judges likewise par-
ticipate as lecturers and program advisors. This is consistent with judges' and attor-
neys' responsibility to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in
it.").
153. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Bias on the Bench: Judicial Conflict of Interest, 3 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 245, 245, 250-51 (1989) [hereinafter Shaman, Bias on the Bench].
Judges, after all, must live in the real world, and cannot be expected to sever
all of their ties with it upon taking the bench. Nor would it be entirely bene-
ficial to the judicial process for judges to isolate themselves from the rest of
society. Involvement in the outside world enriches the judicial temperament
and enhances a judge's ability to make difficult decisions.
[B]ias or prejudice do not refer to the attitude that a judge may hold about
the subject matter of a lawsuit. That a judge has a general opinion about a
legal or social matter, or influenced policy that relates to the case before him
or her, does not disqualify the judge from presiding over the case. Despite
earlier fictions to the contrary, it is now understood that judges are not with-
out opinions when they hear and decide cases. Judges do have values, which
cannot be magically shed when they take the bench. The fact that a judge
may have publicly expressed views about a particular matter prior to its aris-
ing in court should not automatically amount to the sort of bias or prejudice
that requires recusal.
Id. See also Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2-3 (1988).
[J]udges are not blank slates, especially in regard to the law. It is a fantasy
to expect that judges will have no prior opinion about the vast majority of
legal issues that come before them. Indeed, after years of studying, practic-
ing, and caring about the law, any person who did not entertain opinions
about it probably wouldn't make a very good judge. The fact is that judges
do-and should-have opinions about civil rights, torts, contracts, wills and
trusts, and most other areas of the law. While judges should be open-
minded to some -degree about legal issues, open-mindedness is not the
equivalent of impartiality, and it is unrealistic to think that judges are impar-
tial about legal matters.
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of evidentiary facts regarding a proceeding. '" 154 Thus, while judges
may learn about the law, or other disciplines-including economics
or science-and may also learn about current events, learning spe-
cific facts relevant to a litigation may require the judge later to be
disqualified in that litigation. Additionally, generally speaking, a
judge should not become affiliated or closely identified with an or-
ganization that is, or probably will be, engaged in litigation before
the judge or the judge's court. 55 Doing so will cast doubt on the
judge's capacity to act impartially where the organization is a
154. Shaman, Bias on the Bench, supra note 153, at 259-60; see also MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(a) (1990) (a judge shall disqualify himself or
herself when "the judge has . . . personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding").
155. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(C)(3)(a) (1990); see, e.g.,
Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-8 (May 28, 1998) (advising that a judge
may not belong to victim's rights organization which seeks to sponsor unofficial train-
ing for judges, review judicial rulings and sentences, and support bills and legislation,
because membership in such an organization would cast a reasonable doubt on the
judge's capacity to act impartially); Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 98 (June
12, 1987) (opining that a judge may not become dues paying member of plaintiffs' or
defendants' Trial Lawyers Association); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-7 (Mar. 22,
1994) (opining that a judge may not endorse association's support of laws addressing
such issues as sexual harassment, violence against women, and reproductive choice);
Supreme Court of Kan., Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-70 (Sept. 16, 1996)
(opining that a district judge may not serve on a police department community advi-
sory board whose purpose is to advocate community policing and improve police ser-
vices, because "[m]embership on the board would give the impression that judges, as
members, were closely associated with the police department and the prosecutorial
function, and thus would cast reasonable doubt on the judges' ability to act impar-
tially"); Supreme Court [of Mass.], Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 98-13 (Aug. 27,
1998) (opining that a judge may not serve on city's Community Policing Commission,
because participation would convey the impression that police were in a position to
influence judge); Okla. Advisory Panel, Op. 98-1 (Mar. 26, 1998) (opining that a judge
may not become a member of a Task Force on Domestic Violence, because "it is an
organization that will frequently be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily
come before the Judge or will be frequently in adversary proceedings in the Court of
which the Judge is a member"). See generally THODE, supra note 140 at 76; Steven
Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 984 & n.11 (citing
additional examples).
[Canon] 4C specifically authorizes [the judge's participation in bar associa-
tion activities and law reform or improvement organizations] as another
means of keeping the judge in contact with the world around him and as a
way of making his expertise available in the ever-continuing effort to im-
prove the law. The judge must not, however, become involved in a way that
casts doubt on his impartiality. The "impartiality" standard would, for ex-
ample, prevent a judge from participating as a member or officer of a parti-
san legal organization that champions one special interest in litigation that
may be heard in the court on which he sits. Such a relationship would al-
most certainly cast doubt on a judge's capacity to decide impartially the is-
sues in that type of litigation.
THODE, supra note 140, at 76.
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party. 156 Likewise, it has been deemed improper for a judge to at-
tend a "training program" that is designed to accomplish a particu-
lar litigation objective. 157 Additionally, a judge is forbidden from
156. There is no bright line between organizations concerned with the law and legal
institutions, which judges are encouraged to participate in as members or officers, and
those advocacy organizations which judges are forbidden from joining because of con-
cerns about appearance of partiality. See Cal. Judges Ass'n, Comm. on Judicial Ethics,
Op. 46 (July 1997).
It is impossible to draw a bright line between permissible and impermissible
participation. However, whenever a group engages in advocacy with respect
to substantive legal issues, participation by judges should be scrutinized with
great care. If the group engages in such advocacy as to make judicial partici-
pation improper, it is not permissible to separate the judge from the advo-
cacy functions of the organization and limit his or her involvement to the
non-advocacy functions of the organization since the public will nevertheless
perceive the judge as fostering the advocacy functions of the organization.
Factors to be considered in determining whether judicial participation is
appropriate include: (1) the extent to which the group engages in political or
advocacy activities; (2) the extent to which the group is perceived by the
public as engaging in political or advocacy activities; (3) the size and public
prominence of the organization; (4) whether the issues which concern the
group are likely to come before the court; (5) whether the group is con-
cerned with procedural or substantive changes in the law or the application
of the law; (6) whether the judge is participating in a policy making position;
(7) the fundraising activities of the group.
No single one or combination of these factors is determinative. The ulti-
mate test for judicial participation in such bodies is whether the judge's asso-
ciation with the group, and the necessarily resulting public perception that
the judge supports the group, is likely to lead to a public perception that the
judge's impartiality in administering the law may be questioned.
To the extent that such groups are devoted to the improvement of the law,
the legal system or the administration of justice, judicial participation is per-
mitted. In fact, judges are encouraged by the canons to engage in activities
which help to improve the administration of justice and the legal system.
[Canon 4A, 4B] However, problems arise when the group engages in advo-
cacy towards the adoption, repeal or modification of particular substantive
laws or towards the courts' use and application of existing laws in a particu-
lar manner. Judicial participation in groups engaging in such advocacy cre-
ates a danger that the judge's ability to act impartially may be cast in
doubt ....
Id.
157. In N.Y. Advisory Comm. On Judicial Ethics, Op. 94-31 (Mar. 10, 1994), the
advisory committee opined that part-time local court justices may not properly accept
an invitation to attend "a 'specialized training' program designed for prosecutors and
magistrates" that would include instruction on substance detection procedures where
the program was offered jointly by the state Division of Criminal Justice Services and
the Bureau For Municipal Police for the avowed "purpose of ... 'provid[ing] the
information essential for effective prosecution of the drunk/drugged driver and the
judicial details related to conducting such a trial.'" The committee reasoned that the
justices' attendance would create the appearance of impropriety:
The training program's purpose and agenda are clearly planned to enhance
the conviction rate of people accused of alcohol and drug-related vehicle and
traffic crimes. While that is or may be a laudable, overall societal goal, it is
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participating in partisan political activities, even including (in some
jurisdictions) educational activities of a partisan political organiza-
tion (i.e., a political party). 58 These limitations would not, how-
ever, generally restrict a judge from attending a program relating
to the law, simply because the program may be biased or one-
sided.'5 9
Similarly, in an opinion written by the Committee on Judicial
Ethics of the California Judges Association, the Committee ob-
served that judges are encouraged to participate in the activities,
including the educational activities, of organizations like state and
local bar associations and specialty bar associations, such as busi-
not one which the Judiciary shares as part of its constitutional mandate. The
Judiciary exists to assure fairness and impartiality to all those accused of
crime, and to protect their legal rights. To participate in the proposed educa-
tional enterprise would at least appear to place that mission at risk.
Judges, of course, should be encouraged to attend seminars, but only ones
whose agendas are not born of strictly partisan concerns.
Id.; see also Supreme Court [of Mass.], Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 98-9 (July 28,
1998) (opining that a judge may not participate in meetings of the Safe Neighborhood
Initiative, an organization comprised of police and prosecutors that essentially per-
forms a law enforcement function (e.g., targeting areas for increased police surveil-
lance or setting priorities about what crimes to target) because the judge would be
exposed to prosecutorial concerns without equal exposure to the countervailing con-
cerns of the defense bar about the possible inaccuracy of facts presented at the meet-
ings or the possible unfairness of overzealous prosecution); Supreme Court [of Mass.],
Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 97-8 (Sept. 6, 1997) (opining that a judge may not
participate in tour of city organized by an organization representing government
agencies "with an agenda that takes a strong position on one side of issues that come
before the court," where "[t]he purpose of the tour is to show members of the court
areas of the city affected by activities of defendants who appear before them").
158. See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-14 (July 13, 1998)
("Once again we assert the general principle that [ ] judges are ethically precluded
from appearing before partisan groups, even for educational purposes") (citing prior
opinions); cf Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Op. 98-10 (June 24, 1998) (stating that as
long as a judge does not participate in fund raising, he or she may participate in orga-
nizational events other than those of partisan political organizations); N.Y. Judicial
Ethics Op. 94-69 (June 16, 1994) (noting that a full-time judge may participate in a
community volunteer project organized by a local assemblyman, "provided that the
activity is not of a partisan political nature"; proposed activities, including "visiting
residents of an old-age home, preparing and serving meals to the needy, assisting in
health screening tests ... appear not to contravene that standard.").
159. For example, Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-05 (Apr. 10, 1998)
holds that "a judge's mere presence at an educational program designed for and at-
tended by criminal defense attorneys should be permitted, since it may improve the
administration of justice by providing the judge with current important topics in the
area of criminal law." The committee distinguished this situation from the one ad-
dressed in New York Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 94-31 (discussed in note 157,
supra) "because the purpose of that program was to 'maximize enforcement,' whereas
the only consideration at hand is an educational program dealing with current topics
in criminal law."
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ness trial lawyer associations, family lawyer groups, and similar or-
ganizations.160 Further, although a judge should not become
associated with viewpoints advocated by lawyer organizations that
promote the interests of a limited segment of the bar (such as dis-
trict attorney associations, public defender organizations, and
plaintiff or defense-oriented bar associations), "it would be appro-
priate ... for judges to participate as speakers or to participate in
other capacities in educational programs sponsored by such
groups. '' 161 In this respect, Opinion 67 reflects the prevailing un-
derstanding. Judges engage in a variety of intellectual activities
outside the courtroom-including writing, teaching, and self-edu-
cation-that likely influence their general approach to deciding
cases but do not give rise to a disqualifying personal bias.1 62 This
issue was discussed at length in a slightly different context by the
late Judge Leon Higginbotham while denying a disqualification
motion in a discrimination class action. 163 The motion was based
on an allegation that the judge possessed a personal bias in part
attributable to his role as a scholar of race relations. Judge Higgin-
botham concluded that his work as a scholar, including his partici-
pation in an annual meeting of the Association for the Study of
Afro-American Life and History, was entirely consistent with "the
variety of extra-judicial activities which has been the accepted stan-
dard for judges in this District, in this circuit, and in the nation.1 64
Of the few cases where it was held to be improper for a judge to
attend an educational program, the most frequently discussed is In
re Bonin.65 In that case, a Massachusetts Superior Court chief
judge was suspended and censured for attending a public lecture by
author Gore Vidal held as a fundraiser for defendants in criminal
cases pending in the superior court. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court concluded that by attending the meeting, the chief judge ex-
posed himself to ex parte statements and argumentation on matters
before his court and compromised his position by seeming to sym-
pathize with the views of the group sponsoring the event. 1 66
160. Cal. Judges Ass'n, Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 47 (Sept. 11, 1997).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) ("The fact that an
opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings is not a...
sufficient condition for 'bias and prejudice' recusal, since some opinions acquired
outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge's view of the law
acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice.").
163. Penn. v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
164. Id. at 181.
165. In re Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1978).
166. Id. at 683.
976
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The Bonin decision has been harshly criticized,167 but even giv-
ing it full weight, it would not generally foreclose judges from at-
tending privately-funded judicial seminars. In Bonin, by attending
a lecture, the judge exposed himself to discussions of specific crimi-
nal cases pending in the judge's court that would potentially come
before the judge himself. Further, because the organizers' purpose
in presenting the lecture was to raise funds for the defense of the
defendants in those cases, the judge's purchase of a ticket and at-
tendance might have appeared to be an expression of public sup-
port for those parties in the litigation. Judicial seminars on subjects
such as law and economics are quite different. Although they in-
167. The opinion has been criticized by Northwestern University Law Professor
Steven Lubet (co-author of a leading treatise on judicial ethics):
It is true that a judge must refrain from commentary on pending litigation,
but here the Massachusetts court extended caution beyond the point of rea-
sonable application. Judge Bonin did not comment on pending litigation be-
yond the fact of his attendance at a large meeting. The term "comment" is
defined as a writing, a remark, a statement of opinion, or a talk, and Judge
Bonin did none of these. While it is true that his attendance at the meeting
might cause some to infer that he supported the cause, it is at least equally
likely that it would be interpreted as being motivated by curiosity or interest
in the remarks of the well-known featured speaker. If Judge Bonin had been
assigned to hear the trial or trials in question, a stronger inference of impro-
priety would be possible, but here the judge had no substantive involvement
in the cases, and, indeed, he subsequently removed himself from any partici-
pation in the case. Finally, it is irrelevant that Judge Bonin exposed himself
to "one-sided argumentation." Since Judge Bonin was to make no ruling in
the case, there could be no possible adverse effect from his infection by the
statements made at the meeting. The very notion that judges, as opposed to
jurors, can be contaminated by public discourse is questionable.... In short,
Judge Bonin should have been free to attend the public lecture, so long as he
limited himself to the role of spectator and refrained from making actual
public statements concerning the matters at issue.
Lubet, supra note 145, at 1006-07.
In his article on how judges learn, Judge Weinstein similarly criticized the Bonin
decision:
In general, a judge ought to be able to attend any lecture of public meet-
ing .... Pending cases require special sensitivity lest the judge give the im-
pression that his or her views will have some influence in the case. Yet, on
the facts, the judge was apparently unaware that the meeting was connected
with a pending case. If that were so, pressure to resign and his resignation
were not appropriate. A firm statement by him after the event that he at-
tended to learn and hear the views of an eminent writer, not to support a
view or side in a legal dispute should have sufficed. Judges should not allow
themselves to be denied elementary civil rights.
Even in a large sophisticated town like New York, a judge might hesitate
to attend such a lecture. But it would be abhorrent to censure a judge for
doing so. The Boston decision seems like a bad precedent. Such decisions
should be opposed by the bar and the public press.
Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84, at 553-54.
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volve discussions of the law, there is no indication that they include
discussions of the facts of particular cases that are pending or that
may later come before the judges who attend.168 Nor do these
seminars resemble public fund raising events, such that judges, by
their public attendance, appear to be endorsing the organizers'
cause.
169
Questions might be raised, however, if an educational institution
that sponsors judicial seminars requested judges to send letters to
their contributors. Arguably, the judges' letters of support would
be permissible under Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
4(C)(3)(b)(ii) (1990), which provides that a "judge ... may make
recommendations to public and private fund-granting organiza-
tions on projects and programs concerning the law, the legal system
or the administration of justice[.]" But such letters might also be
168. Obviously, one implication of Bonin is that the educational institutions spon-
soring judicial seminars should take steps to insure that discussions of pending or
future cases do not occur.
169. The Bonin case does suggest, however, that judges should not affirmatively
support the fund raising efforts of partisan organizations. This is consistent with the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which expressly prohibits judges from using their office for
fundraising purposes. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(C)(3)(b)(iv)
(1990) ("A judge as an officer, director, trustee or non-legal advisor, or as a member
or otherwise ... shall not use or permit the use of the prestige of judicial office for
fund-raising or membership solicitation."). See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1211 (Feb. 9, 1972) (explaining that although a
judge may serve as officer of a bar association and, in that capacity, allow his or her
name to be included on the association's letterhead, the judge may not sign a letter
soliciting new members, because doing so would infer that the judge is utilizing the
prestige of the judge's office to persuade lawyers who might appear before the judge
to join the Association); Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-6 (May 28,
1998) (stating that a judge may serve as director of a task force that addresses issues
involving the mentally ill in the criminal justice system, but may not participate in
fund raising activities for a non-profit corporation seeking private funding for mental
health facility connected to the mental health court); Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Ad-
visory Op. 90-20 (Aug. 22, 1990) (stating that a judge's presence and participation as
guest of honor at event would be prohibited if it enhances an associated fund raising
activity); I11. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 96-3 (Mar. 6, 1996) (stating that a judge may
not be speaker or introduce honoree at university scholarship fund raising event, and
may not sit at head table at charitable fund raising event if he is a "speaker" or "the
guest of honor"); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 90-135 (Sept. 18, 1990) (explaining that a
full-time judge may not serve as study group leader in foreign legal study program
sponsored by a private foundation where the judge's level of reimbursement would
depend on the number of participants and the organization would use the judge's
name and title to solicit participants, because this would constitute an impermissible
use of the prestige of the judge's office for the organization's financial advantage and
might appear to involve the exploitation of judicial office for the judge's private gain);
N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 90-129 (Sept. 18, 1990) (noting that a full-time judge may
serve as a member of the judicial honorary board of the NAACP provided that the
judge does not participate in the solicitation of funds).
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criticized for putting the prestige of the judge's office behind the
organization's efforts to raise funds."'
Further, if an organization presenting the judicial seminars
sought to accomplish a particular litigation objective, judges might
be restricted from allying themselves with the organization. Al-
though judges may become involved in organizations that seek to
reform the law, 71 they have been foreclosed from becoming mem-
bers or officers of certain organizations that engage in advocacy
activities, out of concern that the judge's impartiality might be
questioned. 72 For example, Professor Steven Lubet has noted that
"Judges have been counseled to avoid membership in such uncon-
troversial undertakings as an 'antishoplifting' organization and
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, lest they cast doubt on their abil-
ity to preside fairly over theft and drunk driving prosecutions.' 1 73
In the case of such advocacy groups, other expressions of support
short of membership may also be proscribed. 74
170. See La. Supreme Court Comm. On Judicial Ethics, Letter Op. (Aug. 20, 1996)
(stating that it is ethically impermissible for chief justice to write and sign a letter of
support for the work of the National Center for State Courts, to be included in mail
fund-raising solicitations to attorneys and law firms, because doing so lends the pres-
tige of the judicial office to the organization's fund-raising activities).
171. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(B) (1990); see, e.g., Fla.
Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-31 (Nov. 30, 1998) (stating that a judge may
be a member of a voluntary bar association that supports a proposed constitutional
amendment); Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-9 (June 24, 1998) (stating
that a judge may participate in a county community justice coalition); Fla. Judicial
Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 96-9 (May 29, 1996) (stating that a judge may serve as
co-chairman of organization that shared information concerning juvenile offenders
between various groups, including the police, schools, the state attorney, the public
defender's office, and the judiciary).
172. Supra note 155.
173. Lubet, supra note 145, at 996.
174. For example, in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Infor-
mal Op. 86-1516 (Jan. 23, 1986), the ABA ethics committee opined that a judge may
not accept an award from "a specialized bar association, whose members customarily
represent the same side of cases in litigation involving a certain area of the law and
therefore has a clearly identifiable partisan litigation posture." Citing the "appear-
ance of impropriety" standard of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the com-
mittee reasoned that
An award given by a special interest bar association seems almost inevitably
to raise an appearance of impropriety, even though no actual impropriety or
influence upon a judge may exist .... Since acceptance of the award could
be seen by the public as a possible indication that the judge favors the views
of the association giving the award, it would convey an inappropriate image
to the public of undue influence, even if untrue .... The acceptance of an
award by a judge from an association of lawyers which has a clearly identifi-
able partisan litigation viewpoint, whose members are likely to appear
before the judge, also raises a serious question as to the judge's appearance
of impartiality. But see Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 774 P.2d
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There is no indication, however, that any of the three private
institutions that sponsor judicial education espouses a litigation ob-
jective, such that a judge would be foreclosed from supporting their
work through membership or through service as an officer or advi-
sor. Although LEC, FREE and/or LOEC may hold views about
the law and how best to resolve certain legal questions, these are,
at bottom, educational institutions, not litigation advocacy
groups.175 Moreover, even if these educational institutions were
equated with advocacy groups because theyespouse general view-
points about the law, so that a judge could not participate in or-
ganizing their activities or serve in an official capacity, a judge
could still attend their programs. A judge's mere attendance at a
bona fide educational program sponsored by one of these institu-
tions would not create the level of identification between the judge
and the institution that would cast doubt on the judge's ability to
preside in cases where the institution's views were implicated. 176
1003, 1021-22 (Nev. 1989) (permitting judge to receive award from Nevada
Trial Lawyers Association (NTLA), without having to later recuse himself in
litigation where NTLA members represented a party and NTLA filed ami-
cus brief).
175. If these were considered to be advocacy organizations, it would more likely be
impermissible for a judge to become closely involved in their work. In that event,
questions might be raised about a judge's participation on an advisory board or as a
director or about their financial contributions to a program. If judges' close involve-
ment is allowed, however, their participation in organizing and planning judicial edu-
cation programs might be encouraged, not only to better ensure that the programs are
useful to judges, but to reduce the extent to which the programs are ideologically
slanted in one direction or another. It is for this reason that Judge Weinstein has
suggested that judicial education programs be co-sponsored by educational institu-
tions and judicial institutions. See Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84,
at 548, 565.
176. See Cal. Judges Assn., Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 47 (Sept. 11, 1997) (stat-
ing that judges may not join bar association advocating for limited segment of bar, but
may participate in their educational programs), discussed supra notes 160-61; I11. Judi-
cial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-17 (June 17, 1994) (explaining that, although a judge may
not be an honoree of groups such as Court Watchers and MADD, which advocate
changes in the content or enforcement of the laws, a judge may speak before such a
group, because "[m]erely addressing an organization does not carry with it the kind of
implicit endorsement of the organization or its agenda that comes from agreeing to be
honored by that organization"); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 94-76 (Mar. 10, 1994) (not-
ing that judges may attend social events sponsored by a police association); Wash.
Supreme Court, Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 92-10 (1992) (stating that a judge may
participate in seminar presented by State Toxicologist to provide prosecutors with
information about breath and alcohol testing); Wash. Supreme Court, Ethics Advi-
sory Comm., Op. 97-10 (1997) (explaining that, although a judge may not act in advi-
sory capacity for agency that offers advocate services for victims of domestic violence,
because doing so may cast doubt on the judge's impartiality in domestic violence
cases, a judge may participate as a speaker or moderator of an educational sympo-
sium organized by the agency); Wash. Supreme Court, Ethics Advisory Comm., Op.
980
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In sum, even if one assumes that the judicial seminars are one-
sided,177 a judge would not generally be forbidden from attending
them, any more than a judge would be forbidden from reading
books that express a particular viewpoint. Those with differing
perspectives might seek other fora in which to present them, and
judges might be encouraged to expose themselves to a variety of
viewpoints.178 But judges are not confined to learning in the court-
room; the classroom is generally open to them as well.
B. Reimbursement
Although it seems plain that judges may pay their own way to
attend seminars on subjects such as law and economics, one might
argue that judges may not properly accept free tuition, meals, lodg-
ing at resort settings, and reimbursement of travel expenses. As
Advisory Opinion 67 reflects, these comprise a "gift" of significant
value. Various concerns may be raised.
First, as in any situation where a judge receives a gift or payment
for extrajudicial services, there is a possibility that judges will favor
those from whom they receive the financial benefit. Here, of
course, the "gift" comes directly from the educational institutions,
which are not expected to be parties in litigation before the judges.
However, one might fear that out of gratitude for their contribu-
tions to these institutions or a misplaced sense of obligation, judges
may favor the corporate contributors. Certainly, judicial favoritism
toward a corporate party for indirectly providing something of
value to the judge would be highly improper.
Similarly, it might be feared that, out of gratitude for having re-
ceived the benefit of a free education at a resort setting, judges will
employ economics principles or other principles they were taught
in judicial seminars, when otherwise they would have employed
such principles differently or not at all.
Finally, and more realistically, a concern might be raised that be-
cause judges' expenses are paid and some seminars are conducted
in resort settings, judges will attend these seminars at the exclusion
of others which may be more balanced or reflect a different view.
By offering judges, at no expense, an expensive educational pro-
85-3 (1985) (noting that judges may attend a seminar sponsored by law enforcement
agency where a BAC Verifier will be demonstrated).
177. As indicated at the outset, I have made this assumption solely for purposes of
this Article's analysis. I would not have the ability to assess whether the seminars are
in fact balanced or academically biased.
178. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 95, at 36 (remarks of Rep. Frank).
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gram in a plush locale, those holding particular views on the legal
application of economics principles will gain special access to
judges and a special opportunity to influence judges' views.
Various responses might be made to these concerns. It might be
argued that, realistically, whatever gratitude the judges have to-
ward the educational institutions sponsoring the judicial seminars
will not extend to the corporations that contributed toward these
institutions and that, in any case, judges' decision making would
not be affected by whatever gratitude they possess; that, realisti-
cally, judges' views on economics or other subjects taught in judi-
cial seminars, however lavish the settings, will not be influenced by
gratitude for the benefit of having attended at no expense; that,
given the limited time available and the amount of time and effort
required by the law-and-economics seminars in particular, judges'
choices among educational opportunities will be determined by
their perception of the quality of the program, and not by financial
considerations; and that even if forbidding judges from participat-
ing might promote the appearance of impartiality, it is more impor-
tant to encourage ongoing judicial education.
There is room for different resolutions of these competing argu-
ments, as concerns expressed in the media and in Congress demon-
strate. Nonetheless, as discussed below, the existing law and
judicial canons generally permit judges' attendance at privately
funded judicial seminars at no expense and do not require judges
to subsequently recuse themselves in cases where a contributor is a
party.
1. May Judges Participate in Expenses-Paid Programs?
The first question is whether judges may participate in expenses-
paid programs, or whether, to avoid any appearance of impropri-
ety, judges must decline what Advisory Opinion 67 recognizes to
be the "gift" of payment of tuition and expenses. At least for fed-
eral judges, this question is essentially governed by provisions of
the Code of Judicial Conduct that deal explicitly with the circum-
stances under which judges may accept gifts and payments. 179 As
the Federal Advisory Committee found, judges' participation in
the judicial seminars is generally permitted under two specific pro-
visions. The first allows judges to receive a fellowship or scholar-
ship awarded on the same terms as other applicants. 180 This
179. U.S. Judicial Conference, Advisory Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 67
(1998).
180. Id.
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provision would apply to private education seminars because the
educational programs are generally open either to federal judges or
to state judges on an equal basis.181 The second provision allows
judges to accept a gift from any donor whose rights or interests are
not likely to be adjudicated in a proceeding before the judge. Since
the "gift" comes from an educational institution that is unlikely to
appear as a litigant before any particular judge, this provision
would also apply.
Also generally applicable is the provision allowing judges to re-
ceive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for otherwise
permissible extra-judicial activities, if the source of the payments
does not appear to influence the judge's performance or otherwise
appear improper. 182 Under this provision, judges may accept com-
pensation or reimbursement of expenses for teaching and lectur-
ing 83-including, no doubt, under the auspices of institutions that
espouse particular viewpoints. That the judge's lecture takes place
at a lavish setting or that the cost of travel is high does not gener-
ally matter, as long as the judge is only reimbursed for actual ex-
penses. 84 If an educational program can compensate and
reimburse judges who come to teach, they can also pay the ex-
penses of judges who come to learn, absent circumstances giving
rise to "the appearance of impropriety."' 85
181. It should be noted, however, that the programs are open exclusively to judges
(although these educational programs may offer different programs to others). Thus,
while a single set of terms and criteria may be used to decide which federal judges or
state judges may attend, there is not a single set of criteria for judges and non-judges
alike.
182. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(H)(1) (1990).
183. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 4(B), 4(H)(1) (1990)
(permitting a judge to teach, and to receive reasonable compensation for doing so);
N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 90-128 (Dec. 11, 1990) (stating that a judge may accept rea-
sonable compensation for teaching a seminar presented by an independent institute
located on the campus of a private university); cf N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 91-112
(Oct. 31, 1991) (noting that a judge may accept reasonable compensation and reim-
bursement of expenses for a lecture concerning the criminal courts conducted at a
Veterans Administration hospital, but must report the compensation).
184. See N.Y. Judicial Ethics Op. 91-07 (Jan. 24, 1991) (stating that a judge may
present a paper on criminal procedure at a symposium held in a foreign country on
the American judicial system, as long as reimbursement is "limited to the actual cost
of travel, food and lodging incurred by the judge and the judge's spouse").
185. See, e.g., Judicial Qualifications Comm'n of Ga., Op. 15 (Aug. 30, 1977) (advis-
ing that, if foundations contribute to the Judicial College of Georgia to support educa-
tional programs for judges, "judges may in propriety receive the benefits, including
expenses for their attendance at continuing judicial education programs, of contribu-
tions by charitable foundations and the like since foundations are fairly infrequently
involved in litigation and are generally known and recognized as making contribu-
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It would be different, of course, if the seminars were purely
pretextual, if judges were not truly coming to learn, and if the rea-
son for bringing judges to resorts was simply to give them a free
vacation or to allow certain parties special access to the judges. 186
But no one doubts the academic rigor of the privately-funded judi-
cial seminars. The complaint is not that they do not educate
judges, but that, if anything, they educate judges too much on eco-
nomics principles that, some would say, should not be applied to
legal questions in the manner taught. It would be different, too, if
judges were reimbursed for more than their actual costs. There is
no reason to believe, however, that this occurs, and the judges' re-
porting obligation provides some assurance that it does not.
One might argue that even in the case of a bona fide educational
program, judges should not be permitted to take advantage of cer-
tain amenities that are simply expensive and unnecessary. It would
be harder to justify judges' participation in economics seminars if
they took place on the Riviera. As Judge Weinstein recognized, it
does not follow that the seminars must be offered in spartan set-
tings. 87 A comfortable setting serves a pedagogic function. 88
Continuing education programs, such as those sponsored by bar
associations, are often held in resort settings.'8 9
The Advisory Committee's conclusion-that, ordinarily, judges
may participate in privately sponsored educational programs as a
matter of individual discretion-is consistent with the way other
tions to worthwhile causes without expectation of gain or benefit by such charitable
foundations").
186. Cf Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, Op. 13 (July 7, 1977) (opining that ajudge may not accept a law firm's invitation to attend an out-of-state, weekend out-
ing); Nassau County Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 83-1 (Jan. 31, 1983) (opining that a lawyer
may not invite judges to a function, party or dinner solely for the benefit of the judici-
ary, because "then the function would violate the prohibition on offering a gift or
gratuity to Court personnel"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 706 (Sept. 15, 1998) (opining that a lawyer may not host a holiday party for localjudges and law clerks where the only other guests are attorneys in the lawyer's law
firm).
Where the lawyer's invitation to the judges is not incidental to an event that
would in any event take place, but the party is instead targeted at the judici-
ary and the other participants are exclusively lawyers associated with the
lawyer, the event has an appearance of impropriety. The public can reasona-
bly infer that the social event has been held to curry favor for the firm's
attorney's with the judiciary before whom the firm practices to obtain inap-
propriate advantage in matters before the court.
Id.
187. Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84, at 550-51.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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advisory committees have interpreted judicial codes. For example,
a judicial advisory committee in New York State concluded several
years ago that judges may participate in a judicial education pro-
gram dealing with land use issues that was sponsored and con-
ducted by the National Judicial College, notwithstanding the fact
that program expenses, including travel and lodging, would be paid
by the College out of grant money provided by a non-profit trade
association whose membership included home builders, contractors
and others in the housing industry, some of whom were located in
New York State:19
The grant by the trade association to the College may be likened
to a grant to an educational institution which retains full discre-
tion to choose faculty and determine the content of the course
of study. Here, the intended program is under the discretion
and control of the National Judicial College, not the entity that
is providing the funding; and, further, the selection of those who
may attend the program rests with the court system.191
The Advisory Committee's conclusion is also consistent with
how the judicial codes are understood in related contexts.192 In
particular, it is consistent with the prevailing understanding that
judges may attend bar association programs at no expense, 193 even
though bar associations may appear before the courts as parties or
190. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 96-106 (Sept. 5, 1996).
191. Id. Recently, a judicial advisory committee in Arizona addressing the pro-
grams of LOEC and FREE, among others, similarly concluded that "there is no gen-
eral ethical impropriety in attending expenses-paid educational programs sponsored
by non-governmental organizations." Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 00-02 (Apr. 9, 2000). The opinion identified various conditions and limitations,
however, including that corporate or foundation funding must be indirect, the spon-
soring organization may not be appearing in litigation before the judge, compensation
may not exceed actual expenses, and the judge must report the compensation as a gift.
Id.
192. See, e.g., Cal. Judges Ass'n, Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 39 (June 27, 1988)
(stating that a judge may accept travel expenses from an organization, allowing the
judge to participate in a study tour of a foreign country's legal system, when the spon-
soring organization and the persons or organizations funding the program are not
likely to have an interest in matters coming before the judge); State Bar of Mich.,
Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-549 (July 28, 1980) (finding that a judge
and spouse may attend an all-expense paid four-day semi-annual union meeting if the
union and its members are not likely to come before the judge).
193. See, e.g., In re Wiley, 671 A.2d 308, 309 (R.I. 1996). In this opinion, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that a judge may attend the annual dinner dance of the
Rhode Island Trial Lawyers Association (RITLA) as the bar association's guest, a
conclusion which, as discussed in the opinion, was consistent with how other states
had interpreted their judicial codes. Id. at 308 (referring to interpretations of Califor-
nia, Georgia, Maryland, New York, Oregon and South Carolina). The court reasoned
in part:
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as amicus curiae and even though their members regularly appear
before the courts on behalf of clients.
It is ordinarily left to the discretion of individual judges whether
to attend bar association programs at no expense. 94 Even when
the sponsoring bar association or the particular event is explicitly
oriented toward a specific legal perspective, judges may be permit-
We believe that judges in this state should be encouraged to participate in
bar-related activities whether conducted by the Rhode Island Bar Associa-
tion or by other groups including RITLA whose objectives are concerned
with the improvement of the administration of justice and the legal
system ....
[O]ur analysis of the Code of Judicial Conduct in the light of opinions
rendered in other jurisdictions and the commentary that accompanies the
code causes us to believe that judges should not be required to live in isola-
tion. Canon 4B and its commentary affirmatively encourage a judicial of-
ficer to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice either independently "or through a bar association,
judicial conference or other organization dedicated to the improvement of
the law."
Id.; see also Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 91 (Mar. 2, 1981) (finding that a judge
may accept invitations to bar association functions, with or without paying); Wash.
Supreme Court, Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 91-8 (noting that a judge may attend
dinner hosted by bar association, where bar association will pay all expenses).
194. For example, in Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and
Discipline, Op. 95-8 (June 2, 1995), the Board concluded that a judge may accept an
offer from a trial lawyers association to attend its annual meeting without paying a
registration fee:
Gifts are regulated under Canon 5C(4) of the Ohio Code of Judicial Con-
duct. Although many gifts are prohibited, a few gifts are permitted "as a
matter of common sense and in deference to common usage." See E. Wayne
Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 84 (1973). Under Ca-
non 5C(4) a judge may accept an invitation to attend a bar-related function
or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice ....
An annual seminar of a trial lawyers association is a bar-related function
or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice. The interchange of information among lawyers
and judges in an educational setting improves the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice. An invitation by a trial lawyers association to a
judge to attend its seminar at no cost is therefore an acceptable gift under
Canon 5C(4)(a).
Canon 2 requires that "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Ap-
pearance of Impropriety in All His [Her] Activities." Before accepting any
Canon 5C(4)(a) gift, "the circumstances surrounding each gift must be con-
sidered to determine if the requirement of Canon 2 is met." E. Wayne
Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct, 84 (1973). Individual
circumstances may dictate that an otherwise acceptable gift should not be
accepted, but each judge must make that determination.
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ted to participate. 95 Further, as Judge Weinstein noted, judges ac-
cept free travel to, and lodging at, bar association programs held at
expensive resorts. 196 Although the amount of time devoted to legal
education at such programs is small, interaction between the bench
and bar is considered to be worthwhile. The reasoning of a 1996
Rhode Island Supreme Court decision, holding that a judge may
attend a bar association program as its guest, seems equally appli-
cable to the question of whether judges may attend a seminar as a
guest of the educational institution sponsoring it:
Judges should participate in activities of the Rhode Island Bar
Association and other similar groups and organizations that are
dedicated to the improvement of the legal system. Of course,
judges should avoid contamination by inappropriate relation-
ships with those who might seek by ex parte communication to
influence the judge on a pending case. However, avoiding intel-
195. In I11. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 86-19 (June 17, 1987), a committee opined that a
bar association may bear the expense of having judges attend their functions, even if it
is oriented toward attorneys representing a class of litigants (e.g., plaintiffs or
defendants).
The presence of judges at bar association gatherings, where, presumably, all
members of the association may attend, does not give rise to the possibility
of undue influence as may be present in private golf-outings or boat rides
.... [M]any diverse bar associations have been formed. We are aware that
some of these associations are plaintiff oriented while others are defense
oriented, while still others may be neither-nevertheless, we believe that full
and open exchange of ideas, philosophies and the like between lawyers and
the judges should be fostered and we further believe that the bar associa-
tion's functions are a proper and healthy forum for these exchanges.
See also Advisory Comm. on Judicial Conduct of the District of Columbia Courts, Op.
4 (Feb. 22, 1994) (opining that there is no per se bar on judges' attendance at functions
of a specialty bar at no expense, but identifying factors relevant to whether the judge's
participation would create an appearance of partiality); [Ore.] Judicial Conference,
Judicial Conduct Comm., Op. 81-1 (1982) (opining that judges may attend, at reduced
or no tuition, educational seminars and conferences sponsored by bar associations,
including those that represent particular interest groups within the bar); Washington
Ethics Advisory Op. 91-27 (in deciding whether to attend a function of a specialized
segment of the bar on a complimentary basis, "[j]udges should determine whether
their position will be exploited or whether their impartiality might be called into ques-
tion" but should also "keep in mind the isolation which might result if they declined
outright all invitations extended by such groups"); but see Alaska Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct, Op. 99-5 (Dec. 14, 1999) (concluding that judge may not accept free travel
to attend a conference of a bar association affiliated with the plaintiff's bar); [Tenn]
Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 96-4 (June 27, 1996) (judge may not accept invitation to
attend, at no expense, a three-day convention of a defense lawyer's association). Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin, Judicial Conduct Comm., Op. 98-10R (Nov. 18, 1998) (al-
though judge may generally attend a reasonably priced bar association dinner at no
expense, judge may not do so if the association is so specialized that all its members
represent the same side in litigation).
196. Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84, at 550-51.
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lectual exchange among lawyers and academics may lead the
judge to a form of mental asphyxiation that will diminish his or
her effectiveness. A judge should not be isolated from the cur-
rent of ideas abroad in his or her profession or those that may
be contributed by related disciplines. Attendance at meetings of
bar associations and such organizations as RITLA will stimulate
the judge's thought processes whether the judge agrees or dis-
agrees with the positions that may be taken by these
organizations.197
The federal Advisory Committee's conclusion is also consistent
with the rules dealing with judges' involvement with not-for-profit
institutions. The judicial codes distinguish for-profit entities from
charitable foundations and educational institutions. For example,
Canon 4(B)(3) specifically permits a judge to serve as an officer,
director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an organization devoted to
the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration
of justice or of an educational or charitable organization, as long as
the organization is unlikely to be engaged in proceedings before
the judge or the judge's court.198 Although judges may not partici-
pate in fund raising, they are not forbidden from otherwise work-
ing with a not-for-profit institution, even if the institution is
financially supported by entities or individuals who may appear in
litigation.1 99 Thus, the codes recognize a common sense distinction
197. In re Wiley, 671 A.2d at 310.
198. See, e.g., ABA Comm. of Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-
1525 (1988) (opining that a judge, in role as president of an international charitable
foundation, may deliver the president's report to the foundation's biennial
convention).
199. Indeed, although a judge may not personally participate in the solicitation of
funds, a judge may assist the organization in planning fund raising. See, e.g., Cal.
Judges Assn., Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 41 (July 8, 1989) (noting that a judge
may assist in fund raising efforts in a variety of ways that do not promote attendance
at fund raising event or donations). Further, even in the rare situation where a judge
is discouraged from assisting an organization in fund raising through means aside
from solicitation, lest the judge's participation cast reasonable doubt on the judge's
impartiality, a judge would not be forbidden from being a member of the organization
and participating in law-reform or other non-fund raising activities. See, e.g., Ind.
Comm. on Judicial Qualification, Advisory Op. 1-96 (1996) (stating that a judge may
not be guest of honor at a fund raising event, because the presence of a guest of honor
is ordinarily intended to motivate potential donors to attend; ordinarily, however, a
judge may be listed as a committee member or honorary committee member in con-
junction with a fund raising activity or event, except where such participation will cast
doubt on the judge's impartiality, e.g., if the judge will have contact with potential
donors, the group of donors is small, their likely contributions are substantial, and
they are likely to appear in litigation before the judge).
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between a not-for-profit institution and its financial supporters.2°
Even a judge's involvement as an officer of an educational institu-
tion does not give rise to a realistic concern that the judge will
favor its financial supporters in litigation. The same ought to be
true where a judge attends an educational institution's program.
Assuming there may be legitimate cause for concern that the judge
would favor the educational institution,2 °1 there should be no real-
istic concern that the judge would favor its contributors.
In states where government ethics statutes cover state judges,
this is not the end of the inquiry. In some states there is no statute
supplementing the applicable judicial code.2 °2 In other states, stat-
utory provisions concerning judicial conduct do not specifically ad-
dress the receipt of gifts and would appear to permit judges to
200. A similar distinction might fairly be made between charitable foundations,
which do not ordinarily appear before the courts, and potential individual or corpo-
rate donors who are more commonly parties in litigation. See, e.g., Tex. Comm. on
Judicial Ethics, Op. 238 (1999) (noting that as an authorized representative of a not-
for-profit organization, such as the Texas Center for the Judiciary, Inc., that is devoted
to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, "a
judge may solicit contributions only from charitable and educational foundations and
other donors who would not ordinarily come before the court").
201. Cf Fla. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 98-7 (May 28, 1998) (opining
that a judge may not sign or circulate petition to have victims of unresolved murder
case honored on a U.S. postage stamp, because, if someone is charged with the
murders, which occurred nearly 50 years earlier, and the case appeared before the
judge, reasonable doubt would be cast on the judge's capacity to act impartially); N.Y.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 92-22 (Mar. 16, 1992) (stating that a judge
may generally have lunch with a lawyer friend who may appear in litigation before
judge, but should not do so during the course of a trial in which the lawyer is appear-
ing before the judge); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 91-132 (Oct. 31,
1991) (noting that a judge who presided over a murder trial may not subsequently
attend an appreciation luncheon held by relatives of murder victims; attending the
lunch would involve "an appearance of impropriety, especially as the invitation ex-
plicitly states that it is an 'appreciation' luncheon 'in your honor' and thanking the
invited guests for 'your love and support"'); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics,
Op. 90-164 (Dec. 11, 1990) (concluding that where a judge presided over hearings that
resulted in a civic organization obtaining a lease in a historic city owned building, the
judge may not later accept complimentary tickets to a benefit dinner given by the
organization to support the restoration of the building; "[a]lthough judges may attend
civil organizations' fundraising events ... judges [must] avoid the appearance of im-
propriety and avoid conveying the impression that they are in the position to advance
the private interests of others. Attending the dinner of an organization which benefit-
ted from a decision of the judge, even though the organization was not a party, may
convey the impression that the judge is receiving a reward from the organization for
rendering a favorable decision").
202. For instance, in Florida, although there is a generally applicable Ethics in Gov-
ernment statute, it has been found by the state's supreme court to be inapplicable to
the judiciary on separation of powers grounds. See In re Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45, 47
(Fla. 1975).
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participate in expenses-paid judicial seminars insofar as they may
do so under the applicable judicial code.2 °3 In some states, how-
ever, a statute specifically addresses judges' receipt of gifts, hono-
raria, compensation and the like.2 °4 In such states, one must
consider whether the applicable statute permits judges to accept
free tuition, lodging, meals and travel in connection with educa-
tional programs.
The question of whether government ethics statutes apply to
judges and, if so, how they apply to participation in expenses-paid
judicial seminars, may vary from state to state. However, it does
not appear that, as a general rule, state statutes addressing judges'
receipt of gifts forbid judges from participating. For example, in
Ohio, a judge's receipt of gifts is regulated not only by the Ohio
Code of Judicial Conduct, but also by Ohio Ethics Law, which for-
bids a public official from accepting, or using his or her office to
obtain, "anything of value that is of such a character as to manifest
a substantial and improper influence upon him with respect to his
duties. '20 5 It has been held that "If a thing of value is more than
nominal or de minimus [and it] is from a party that is interested in
matters before, regulated by, or doing business with the public offi-
cial's ... agency it is considered an improper influence. ' 20 6 Under
the Ohio law, a judge may attend a bar association meeting without
paying a registration fee because "an offer to attend a seminar at
no cost is in most instances nominal or de minimus to a judge since
the judge is required to attend seminars and seminars have little
likelihood of influencing a judge with respect to his or her official
duties. 207 While the value of economics seminars at resort settings
is more than "de minimus or nominal," judges may still be allowed
to participate:
203. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2.1 (Michie 1998);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.301-15.310, 15.341-.348, 15.321-15.328 (Michie 2001); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 10A (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-13 (West 2001); N.Y. JUDI-
CIARY LAW CT. ACTS § 14 (McKinney 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, App. 4
(West 2001).
204. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 170.9 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-11
(2001); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 425/1-10 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T § 15-505 (2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268A, § 2 (Law Co-op. 1992); OHIO.
REV. CODE ANN. § 120.03(E) (Anderson 1997); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1103(c)
(West 2000); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 572.051 (Vernon 2002); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.1.-639.4 (Mitchie); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.52.140-.150 (West 2000).
205. Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op.
95-8 (June 2,1995) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.03).
206. Id. (citing authority).
207. Id.
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A public official or employee may accept travel, meals, and
lodging or expenses or reimbursement of expenses for travel,
meals and lodging in connection with conferences, seminars, and
similar events related to official duties if the travel, meals and
lodging, expenses, or reimbursement is not of such a character
as to manifest a substantial and improper influence upon the
public official or employee with respect to that person's
duties.2 °8
Since the educational institutions sponsoring the programs are
unlikely to be parties with an interest in matters before the court, it
seems unlikely that judges' decision making will be influenced by
receiving free tuition, meals and lodging, and reimbursement of
travel expenses.20 9 Likewise, in California,210 Illinois,21' Mary-
208. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.03(l) (Anderson 1997).
209. Cf Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline,
Op. 92-14 (Aug. 14, 1992) (opining that magistrates may not accept financial support
for educational program from law firms, individuals and businesses interested in mat-
ters before, regulated by, or doing or seeking to do business with the courts and re-
serving question whether low registration fees and free lodging could be viewed as an
impermissible supplement to the magistrates' salary under Olio REVISED CODE
ANN. § 2921.43 (Anderson 1997)).
210. California's statutory restriction on judges' receipt of gifts, see CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 170.9 (West 2002), contains exceptions that appear to permit California state
judges to attend the judicial seminars offered by organizations like LOEC. First, the
statute's definition of "gift" specifically excludes "free... tuition ... for informational
conferences or seminars." Id. at § 170.9(l)(1). Second, the statute permits "reim-
bursements for travel, including actual transportation and related lodging and subsis-
tence which is reasonably related to a judicial or governmental purpose" in various
circumstances, including where "[t]he travel is provided by ... a bona fide public or
private educational institution, as defined in Section 203 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code, or a nonprofit charitable or religious organization which is exempt from taxa-
tion under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code .... " Id. at § 170.9(e); cf.
Cal. Judges Ass'n, Judicial Ethics Update 8 (Jan. 1997) ("If a judge is asked to partici-
pate in an educational program, reimbursement of registration, meals and lodging
costs are not gifts."); id. at 9 ("A judge and spouse may accept reimbursement for
transportation, meals, and lodging to attend a week-long function at a foreign resort
sponsored by the local bar association. The judge will participate in 1-2 hour seminars
each day.").
211. In Illinois, the State Gift Ban Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 425/1 (West Supp.
2001), applies to judges and provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act,
no ... judge shall solicit or accept any gift from any prohibited source or in violation
of any federal or State statute, rule or regulation .... No prohibited source shall offer
or make a gift that violates this Section." 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 425/10 (West Supp.
2001). "Prohibited source" is defined, inter alia, as any person who or entity which "is
seeking official action by the . . . judge," "does business or seeks to do business
with ... the judge," "conducts activities regulated by ... the judge," or "has interests
that may be substantially affected by the ... judge." Id. at 425/5. Exceptions include
the following: (i) "[tiraining (including food and refreshments furnished to all at-
tendees as an integral part of the training) provided to a... judge, if the training is in
the interest of the governmental entity," id. at 425/15(13), (ii) "[e]ducational missions,
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land, 212 Massachusetts, 213 Pennsylvania,2 14 Texas,2 15 Virginia, 2 6 and
including meetings with government officials either foreign or domestic, intended to
educate public officials on matters of public policy, to which the ... judge may be
invited to participate along with other federal, state, or local public officials and com-
munity leaders," 425/15(14), or (iii) "[f]ree attendance at a widely attended event per-
mitted under section 20," id. at 425/15(18). In turn, subsection 20 provides that
"[a] ... judge may accept an offer of free attendance at a widely attended convention,
conference, symposium, forum, panel discussion, dinner, viewing, reception, or similar
event, provided by the sponsor, if (1) the ...judge participates in the event as a
speaker or a panel participant, by presenting information related to government, or
by performing a ceremonial function appropriate to the ... judge's official position or
employment; or (2) attendance at the event is appropriate to the performance of civic
affairs in Illinois or the official duties or representative function of the ... judge." Id.
at 425/20. The Act also contains a section providing that reimbursement "for neces-
sary transportation, lodging, and related expenses for travel to a meeting, speaking
engagement, fact finding trip or similar event in connection with the duties of the...
judge ... shall be deemed to be reimbursement to the governmental entity and not a
gift prohibited by this act" if it is properly disclosed. Id. at 425/30. Given the breadth
of this provision, judges' reimbursement by the programs appears to be permissible.
Assuming that the seminars at issue can fit within the meaning of section 20-that is,
a widely attended symposium at which the judge participates as a speaker or a panel
participant-free tuition would be permissible. Moreover, fee reimbursement or free
tuition should also be permissible if the law-and-economics seminars can be classified
as "[e]ducational missions" or "[t]raining."
212. In Maryland, there is a general prohibition against judges (and other public
officers) accepting gifts, see MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 15-505(b) (2000); how-
ever, there is also a specific exception for receipt of "reasonable expenses for food,
travel, lodging or scheduled entertainment" if the expenses are associated with a
panel or speaking engagement at which the official participated. § 15-505(c)(2)(vi).
This exception is available so long as reimbursement does not give the appearance of
impairing judicial neutrality and the recipient has no reason to believe that the gift is
designed to impair his or her neutrality. Id. Thus, the gift restrictions appear to per-
mit judges to attend.
213. The gift restrictions in Massachusetts are primarily concerned with quid pro
quo arrangements. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268A, §§2-4 (Law. Co-op. 1992). As
there has been no allegation of any quid pro quo arrangements in the case of judicial
education programs, these provisions are inapplicable.
214. In Pennsylvania, the Public Official and Employee Ethics Acts prohibits public
officials, inter alia, from (i) "solicit[ing] or accept[ing] anything of monetary value,
including a gift ... based on any understanding of that public official ... that the ...
judgment of the public official... would be influenced thereby," 65 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1103(c) (West 2000); and (ii) accepting honoraria, § 1103(d). Although there
is no specific safe harbor for judicial education seminars, these provisions should not
bar judges from attending the programs at issue because the benefits conferred-
tuition and reimbursed travel expenses-cannot reasonably be seen as conditioned on
judges taking official action in favor of the donor. Nor can cost-free attendance at
such seminars be properly understood as honoraria, which the act defines as
"[p]ayment made in recognition of published works, appearances, speeches and
presentations and which is not intended as consideration for the value of such services
which are nonpublic occupational or professional in nature." § 1102.
215. In Texas, judges (and other state officers) are prohibited from
(1) accept[ing] or solicit[ing] any gift, favor, or service that might reasonably
tend to influence the officer or employee in the discharge of official duties or
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Washington 217 -government ethics statutes, insofar as they apply
that the officer or employee knows or should know is offered with the intent
to influence the officer's or employee's official conduct;
(3) accept[ing] other employment or compensation that could reasonably be
expected to impair the officer's or employee's independence of judgment in
the performance of the officer's or employee's duties;
(5) intentionally or knowingly solicit[ing], accept[ing], or agree(ing] to ac-
cept any benefit for having exercised the officer's or employee's official pow-
ers or performed the officer's or employee's official duties in favor of
another.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 572.051(1), (3), (5) (Vernon 2001). "Gift," "favor," and
"service" are not defined terms under chapter 572, nor are there any available safe
harbors. However, judges' participation in the education seminars at issue should not
present a difficult question. With respect to subsection (3), a judge's attendance at a
judicial education seminar cannot "reasonably be expected to impair" his or her "in-
dependence of judgment" given the intellectual independence and sophistication of
judges. Under subsection (5), there is no evidence of any quid pro quo arrangement.
Finally, although the language of subsection (1) is broad, read in light of the provi-
sions' legislative purpose attendance presents little problem. See § 572.001(a) ("It is
the policy of this state that a state officer or state employee may not have a direct or
indirect interest, including financial and other interests, or engage in a business trans-
action or professional activity, or incur any obligation of any nature that is in substan-
tial conflict with the proper discharge of the officer's or employee's duties in the
public interest.") (emphasis supplied).
216. In Virginia, the statutory ethics provisions applicable to judges provide that
"[n]o officer or employee of a state or local governmental or advisory agency shall
1. Solicit or accept money or other thing of value for services performed
within the scope of his official duties, except the compensation, expenses or
other remuneration paid by the agency of which he is an officer or
employee ....
5. Accept any money, loan, gift, favor, service, or business or professional
opportunity that reasonably tends to influence him in the performance of his
official duties ....
8. Accept a gift from a person who has interests that may be substantially
affected by the performance of the officer's or employee's official duties
under circumstances where the timing and nature of the gift would cause a
reasonable person to question the officer's or employee's impartiality in the
matter affecting the donor ....
9. Accept gifts from sources on a basis so frequent as to raise an appearance
of the use of his public office for private gain ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3103 (Michie 2001). For reasons discussed in note 216 supra,
these provisions should not (as a general matter) present difficulties for judges wish-
ing to attend the programs.
217. In Washington, although there are general legislative proscriptions on judges'
(and other public officers') acceptance of gifts, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.52.140-150 (West 2001), there are safe harbor provisions applicable in this con-
text. Specifically, judges may permissibly receive free of cost "[i]nformational mate-
rial, publications, or subscriptions related to the recipient's performance of official
duties," § 42.52.150(2), and "[p]ayment of enrollment and course fees and reasonable
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to judges, have provisions that appear to permit participation in
educational programs as an exception to restrictions on the receipt
of gifts.2 18
In sum, the judiciary's conclusion that judges are not legally or
ethically forbidden from participating in privately-funded educa-
tion seminars and that the decision whether to attend is for judges
to make individually, 219 reflects a fair reading of the law. This im-
plies, of course, that judges must be given accurate information
about the seminars when they are invited, so that they can decide
for themselves whether it is proper to attend. Insofar as any pro-
gram provided misleading information, it might fairly be criticized.
But there is nothing to indicate that judges attending these pro-
grams are being misled about what to expect.
2. Must Judges Be Recused From Cases Involving Contributors?
The second question is whether judges who attend a seminar
must later recuse themselves in cases involving a corporate contrib-
utor to the program or a party affiliated with a contributor.
travel expenses attributable to attending seminars and educational programs spon-
sored by a bona fide governmental or nonprofit professional, educational, trade, or
charitable association or institution." § 42.52.010(10)( 0 . "As used in this subsection,
'reasonable expenses' are limited to travel, lodging, and subsistence expenses incurred
the day before through the day after the event." Id.
218. In at least one state, Georgia, the government ethics statute, insofar as it ap-
plies to judges, arguably limits their attendance at privately funded judicial education
programs. In Georgia, the primary statutory ethical strictures are set forth in title 21,
section 5, entitled "Ethics in Government." Section 11 restricts acceptance of mone-
tary fees and honoraria:
(a) No public officer other than a public officer elected state wide shall ac-
cept a monetary fee or honorarium in excess of $101.00 for a speaking en-
gagement, participation in a seminar, discussion panel, or other activity which
directly relates to the official duties of that public officer or the office of that
public officer.
(b) No public officer elected state wide shall accept any monetary fee or honora-
rium for a speaking engagement, participation in a seminar, discussion panel, or
other such activity.
219. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-11 (2001) (emphasis supplied). Subsection (c), how-
ever, provides a safe harbor: "For purposes of this chapter, actual and reasonable
expenses for food, beverages, travel, lodging, and registration for a meeting which are
provided to permit participation in a panel or speaking engagement at the meeting
shall not be monetary fees or honoraria." Id. at § 21-5-11(c) (emphasis supplied).
This safe harbor, however, does not by its terms cover "participation in a seminar";
thus, attendance at privately funded judicial education programs comes within the
confines of the safe harbor only in the event that it is considered to be "participation
in a panel or speaking engagement." Id. Cf Cribbet, supra note 143, at 81 ("The
acceptance of expenses and a modest honorarium [for public lectures] ... probably
have to be left to the conscience of the individual judge and to the report on sources
of outside income.").
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If the seminars included discussions of the facts of the case, then
the judge's disqualification would be required by the applicable
disqualification statute or judicial ethics code. Judges may not par-
ticipate in cases when they have extrajudicial knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts.220 However, there is no indication that the
seminars include discussions of the facts of pending or future litiga-
tion. Judges would not be required to recuse themselves under
these provisions simply because economics principles discussed in a
seminar may be applicable in a later case.
Nor does the judge's possible gratitude to corporations that con-
tributed to the judicial seminars constitute a disqualifying bias.
One might speculate that the judge would have an incentive to
favor contributors (or their affiliates) either out of personal inter-
est (i.e., the hope of being personally rewarded for favorable rul-
ings by being invited to future programs)221 or out of a broader
institutional interest (i.e., in hope that a favorable ruling will en-
courage contributions to future programs from which judges gener-
ally benefit). These interests, however, are too speculative and
remote to require recusal. This is certainly true as a constitutional
matter since under the Due Process Clause, judges must recuse
themselves only when they have a "direct, personal, and substan-
tial" interest in the outcome of a case,222 but it is no less true under
the disqualification statutes.
Although it might be argued that disqualification is necessary be-
cause the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 223
decades of case law, which give meaning to the disqualification
statutes, make clear that
in order to constitute a cognizable ground for judicial disqualifi-
cation [based on a judge's financial interest in a party or pending
proceeding], a judge ordinarily must have a real, certain, pre-
sent, immediate, and demonstrable financial interest in the sub-
ject matter of the proceeding before her, and one that is capable
of estimated monetary value.
Thus, where the interest possessed by the challenged judge is
either indirect, attenuated, contingent, incidental, remote, spec-
ulative or inconsequential, it is generally not the kind of interest
220. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(a) (1990).
221. This speculation is counterfactual, since the contributors have no control over
who is invited and there is no indication that the selection process takes account of
the judge's prior decisions or leanings.
222. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825-26 (1986).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994).
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that would reasonably bring her impartiality into question or
warrant disqualification. 2 4
The possibility is simply too remote and conjectural that a judge
will favor a party in litigation because it, or an entity with which it
is affiliated, contributed to an educational institution that spon-
sored a seminar attended by the judge.225 The possibility that the
judge will later benefit by being invited to future seminars is too
conjectural-especially where, as in the case of the law-and-eco-
nomics seminars, donors have no control over who is invited. Fur-
ther, the judge's relationship with the donor is too indirect to
require recusal.226
There is one notable case, In re School Asbestos Litigation,2 7 in
which a judge was disqualified from continuing to participate in a
litigation after having attended an education program which paid
224. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 208-10 (1996) (citing
authorities).
225. See In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695-96 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that a
judge is not required to recuse himself where a defendant previously acted favorably
toward a governmental administration for which the judge worked; even assuming the
judge felt gratitude for past favors, "it is beyond contemplation that such gratitude
would be of the weight necessary to cause a judge to jettison his impartiality and, in
open court day after day, to violate his deepest professional and ethical commitments
as a judge .... If the receipt by a judge's friend of a favor long ago from one who is a
present litigant should disqualify the judge, judges could hope to preside without chal-
lenge solely in communities in which they are strangers"); see also FLAMM, supra note
224, at 179 ("[T]he fact that a judge received a gift or favor from an attorney prior to
the inception of a pending proceeding is not ordinarily considered to be disqualifying
per se.").
226. Judges need not automatically recuse themselves when their former lawyers,
law partners, or employers are involved in a proceeding. See, e.g., McKeague v. Tal-
bert, 658 P.2d 898 (Haw. 1983) (recusal not automatically required where judge's for-
mer attorney appears in proceeding); Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory
Op. 95-11 (June 16, 1995) (same); Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Judicial Eth-
ics Op. 99-3 (Apr. 1999) (same); Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Judicial Ethics
Op. 98-18 (Oct. 12, 1998) (opining that recusal is not automatically required where a
judge's former partner or a employer is a party). It would therefore seem anomalous
to require disqualification simply because a party in the proceeding is a contributor to
a judicial education program that the judge once attended. The judge's former con-
nection with the contributor is far more tenuous than the connection to a former
lawyer, law partner, or employer. The result might be different-certainly, many
judges would see it as different-if one of the institutional sponsors of the seminars
(e.g., LEC) itself appeared in litigation before a judge who was then attending one of
these seminars. See, e.g., Weinstein, How Many Judges Learn, supra note 84, at 551
(discussing Justice Scalia's participation in a case involving the Kentucky Bar Associa-
tion, after accepting a fee to speak at a function sponsored by the Kentucky Bar Asso-
ciation at the University of Kentucky Law School); see also In re Seraphim, 294
N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1980) (sanctioning judge, in part, for accepting favorable car rental
arrangement from local company during and after its appearance before him).
227. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).
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for his expenses.2 28 In that case, U.S. District Judge Kelly, while
presiding over an asbestos-related class action, granted the plain-
tiffs' application to use $50,000 from the settlement fund to help
finance a conference on the dangers of asbestos. Thereafter, the
organizers invited various state and federal judges to attend the
conference. The organizers waived the judges' registration fees
and provided hotel accommodations. 229 Fifteen judges attended
the conference, including Judge Kelly, who had forgotten that the
conference was supported by the settlement funds. The organizers'
promotional literature made reference to the judges' appear-
ance.23° Although the court of appeals did not identify any prob-
lem with the other judges' attendance, the court found that Judge
Kelly was required to recuse himself because "a reasonable person,
knowing all the circumstances, might question the district judge's
continued impartiality. 2 31 The court gave the following reasons
for its decision:
[Judge Kelly] attended a predominantly pro-plaintiff conference
on a key merits issue; the conference was indirectly sponsored
by the plaintiffs, largely with funding that he himself had ap-
proved; and his expenses were largely defrayed by the confer-
ence sponsors with those same court-approved funds.
Moreover, he was, in his own words, exposed to a Hollywood-
style "pre-screening" of the plaintiffs' case: thirteen of the eigh-
teen expert witnesses the plaintiffs were intending to call gave
presentations very similar to what they expected to say at trial.
We need not decide whether any of these facts alone would have
required disqualification, for ... we believe that together they
create an appearance of partiality that mandates
disqualification.232
It seems clear from the opinion that recusal was not required
simply because the judge had his expenses paid to attend a confer-
ence dealing with issues relating to asbestos cases. On the con-
trary, the court found it "admirable" that the judge held the "view
that judicial education about the scientific aspects of these cases
would improve judicial case management." '233 What made Judge
Kelly's situation uniquely troublesome was that the expenses of the
conference, and his own expenses, were defrayed by funds that the
228. Id. at 779.
229. Id. at 780.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 781.
232. Id. at 781-82.
233. Id. at 778-79.
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judge himself had approved, and that the presenters at the confer-
ence previewed the testimony that they were to give in the very
case before the judge.3 The judicial seminars do not present
these problems.
In sum, disqualification provisions, as conventionally inter-
preted, do not require judges who attend judicial seminars to re-
cuse themselves from participating in cases where a party is a
contributor or is affiliated with a contributor to these programs.235
This is not to say that a judge who has attended a law-and-econom-
ics program is without discretion to recuse himself or herself in
cases where the program's contributors, or affiliated corporations,
are parties.236 The point is simply that, under generally prevailing
understandings, the judge would not clearly be required to do so.
IlI. THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REGULATION
Consistent with how courts have interpreted and applied rele-
vant judicial regulation in related contexts, judges have concluded
that it is ordinarily permissible to attend expenses-paid judicial
seminars sponsored by LEC, LOEC, and FREE on subjects such
as law and economics or environmental law, even though the
presentations may be biased in favor of the legal interests of the
corporations that fund them. As discussed earlier, 37 this is evi-
234. But cf Supreme Court of N.J., Advisory Comm. on Extrajudicial Activities,
Op. 15-89 (stating that a judge may attend, all expenses paid, a symposium and con-
ference, sponsored by the National Judicial Conference and funded by both sides of
the Johns-Manville asbestos litigation, designed for judges with three or more Johns-
Manville asbestos cases to explore issues and strategies of their management).
235. Some might, however, make the further argument that if the judge's disqualifi-
cation is not required under the governing standards, the judge should not respond to
pressure to recuse himself or herself. See Rehnquist, supra note 138, at 713 ("I do not
think our profession will be well served by the creation of a climate of professional
opinion in which the kudos invariably go to the judge who is quickest to disqualify
himself .... Far more important than unanimity as to particular standards of disquali-
fication is the recognition that outside of the area of corruption or reasonable suspi-
cion of improper motives, disqualification is an issue to be decided by rational
application of the governing standards to the facts of the case in a lawyer-like way.")
236. To make this discretionary decision, a judge who previously attended a pri-
vately-funded judicial seminar or who plans to attend one must be able to ascertain
that a corporate party or other party appearing in litigation before the judge was a
contributor, or was affiliated with a contributor, to the organization sponsoring the
seminar. This suggests, first, that organizations sponsoring judicial seminars should
make lists of their contributors available to judges who participate and who are in-
vited to do so. This suggests, additionally, that to enable other parties to alert the
judge to the question of recusal, these organizations should make lists of both contrib-
utors and judicial participants available to the public.
237. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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dently the view of individual judges who have attended the semi-
nars. Presumably, before attending, they decided that it would be
ethically permissible to do so; their subsequent unwillingness to
criticize the programs and, in many cases, their praise of the pro-
grams and attendance of multiple programs, suggests that they ad-
hered to this view afterwards. This is also the apparent
understanding of institutions of the judiciary, such as a panel of the
Second Circuit which recently held that a district judge who had
attended an expenses-paid environmental seminar may continue to
preside over an environmental lawsuit.238
Some critics of the judicial seminars have argued that insofar as
existing judicial regulation permits judges to participate in these
programs, the regulation is inadequate. This argument is implicit
in proposals for congressional legislation to limit federal judges'
participation in such programs.239 The argument has been explic-
itly made by Community Rights Counsel,24 ° which particularly
takes issue with the United States Judicial Conference's Opinion
67.241 CRC raises two principal criticisms. First, it contends that
the standard set by the opinion, which is based on such undefined
terms as "source of funding" and "involved in litigation," is unduly
vague.242 Second, it argues that the opinion requires individual as-
sessments that are too burdensome for individual judges to
make. 43 Examples include assessments about the seminar's spon-
sor, its funding, the content of the seminar, and whether the semi-
nar, its sponsor or its funders have any relationship to litigation
that has been or may be brought before the particular judge.
CRC's criticisms of the framework of judicial regulation, at least
in general terms, are not particularly compelling. It is in the nature
of judicial ethics that the applicable rules are vague and that indi-
vidual judges are primarily responsible for applying them. The
standard of judicial conduct must be open-textured because there
is no way to draw a clear line between proper and improper extra-
judicial conduct, including educational programs that judges may
238. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2000); see also supra text accompanying
notes 105-23.
239. See supra text accompanying note 15.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 68-77.
242. DouG KENDALL, CMTY. RIGHTS COUNSEL, NOTHING FOR FREE: How PRI-
VATE JUDICIAL SEMINARS ARE UNDERMINING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND
BREAKING THE PUBLIC'S TRUST 92 (2000).
243. Id. at 93.
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and may not attend in particular.244 Further, given the variety of
opportunities available to different judges over time and variations
among caseloads, the decision whether a particular judge may at-
tend any particular program or engage in other extrajudicial con-
duct must, in the end, be resolved by the judge based on a variety
of individual facts.
The more compelling criticism is that the traditional judicial reg-
ulatory framework fails to address a unique problem posed by the
judicial seminars sponsored by LEC, LOEC, and FREE. Because
these seminars are exclusively designed for, and open to judges,
and offered on an ongoing basis, they have a potential impact on
decision making by judges not only individually but collectively. In
effect, the three institutions appear to have privatized judicial edu-
cation. Consequently, their programs pose a risk not only to public
confidence in the integrity of individual judges, which judicial eth-
ics regulation addresses reasonably well, but also a risk to public
confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Judicial regulation
fails to take account of the latter problem, created by the aggrega-
tion of potentially small influences on individual judges.
To illustrate the incompleteness of existing regulation, consider
the following three hypothetical programs. The first two pose indi-
vidual problems of the type that the judicial ethics rules address;
the last one poses a problem, like the one posed by the law-and-
economics seminars, that is not adequately addressed by current
regulation.
First, consider the paradigmatic Continuing Legal Education
(CLE) Program. A law school or bar association, whose primary
goals do not include educating judges, organizes an educational
program on a subject-say, law and economics-that is meant for
lawyers generally. The program will be offered on a one-time-only
basis in a resort setting and is funded by several corporations.
Judge is invited to attend at the expense of the sponsoring entity.
244. See supra note 156; see also Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 00-02 (Apr. 9, 2000) ("No advisory opinion can replace common sense. A judicial
officer needs to be sensitive to the issues presented by an invitation to attend a con-
ference at reduced expenses or expense free. An advisory opinion cannot anticipate
all the varying circumstances that can be presented."); Advisory Comm. on Judicial
Conduct of the District of Columbia Courts, Op. 4 (Feb. 22, 1994) ("the sheer number
of [bar-related] organizations [is] so large, and the publicly declared organizational
missions and memberships of such organizations [is] so diverse, that it would be futile
to develop a blanket rule with regard to judicial attendance at all specialty bar-related
functions").
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In this case, the propriety of Judge's attendance depends on
whether Judge's attendance will undermine public confidence in
the integrity of her future work as a judge. That is the question on
which judicial regulation focuses. One relevant consideration is
whether the sponsor or one of the corporate funders is presently
appearing or is likely to appear before Judge, in which case there is
a need to assess the risk that Judge will favor the entity out of grati-
tude. Another is whether the program will specifically address a
particular lawsuit that is or may be before Judge, in which case the
risk must be assessed that Judge will receive a one-sided version of
facts outside the context of a judicial proceeding. Absent either of
these problems, Judge's attendance would ordinarily be permissi-
ble. Judicial regulation is not particularly concerned with the risk
that the program will influence Judge's philosophy in general
terms, and rightly so. This program is unlikely to be designed spe-
cifically to influence Judge, since the sponsoring entity is not pri-
marily concerned with judicial education and the program itself is
geared to a much larger audience comprised overwhelmingly of
non-judges. Further, since the program is offered only once, it is
unlikely to be Judge's only source of education on the subject;
Judge will have to look elsewhere for further education on law and
economics.
Next, consider the alternative of an imagined Individual Judicial
Tutorial: An entity is formed for the explicit purpose of teaching
Judge about law and economics and obtains corporate funding to
do so. It designs a program in law and economics that will involve
a series of tutorials offered by distinguished academics in the field.
The entity invites Judge to participate in the tutorials, which will be
offered in a resort setting. The entity will bear the expenses.
This alternative poses the same risks as the CLE Program-the
risk that a particular entity-either the sponsor or a funder-may
influence how Judge decides a particular case, either because Judge
may be grateful to one of those entities when it becomes a party to
a lawsuit or because, through the tutorials, one of these entities
may expose Judge to a one-sided version of facts relating to a par-
ticular litigation. However, the Individual Judicial Tutorial also
poses, far more substantially than the CLE Program, the further
risk that the Judge's judicial philosophy will be influenced in a par-
ticular direction of importance to the corporate funders. Since the
sponsor's purpose is explicitly to educate Judge and the tutorials
are designed exclusively for Judge, the public would fairly infer
that the tutorials will be designed with an eye toward shaping
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Judge's general approach to a class of legal issues that the corpo-
rate funders face. Further, because the tutorials are ongoing, Judge
is unlikely to look elsewhere for education on the subject. Given
the exclusive nature of the tutorials, members of the public have no
opportunity to assuage their concerns about these risks. Almost
certainly, the Individual Judicial Tutorial would be thought to cre-
ate an "appearance of partiality" and therefore, unlike the CLE
Program, be deemed impermissible under existing judicial regula-
tion. The essential problem that the tutorials pose-namely, that a
judge's participation in the tutorials may undermine public confi-
dence in the integrity of the individual judge-is clearly addressed
by the existing regulation.
Finally, consider the alternative of Privatized Judicial Education.
A group of corporations funds an entity for the purpose of educat-
ing as many members of the judiciary as possible, on an ongoing
basis, on the subject of law and economics. The entity creates pro-
grams exclusively for judges and the programs are presented at re-
sort settings at the entity's expense. Many judges attend and some
attend repeatedly. This is essentially the model of LEC, LOEC,
and FREE.
Like the CLE Program and the Individual Judicial Tutorial,
Privatized Judicial Education poses risks from the perspective of
individual judges. These risks are addressed by the judicial regula-
tion. One might argue that Privatized Judicial Education has some
of the same vices as the Individual Judicial Tutorial, since it is open
exclusively to judges, designed for judges, and ongoing. But from
the individual judge's perspective, Privatized Judicial Education
probably looks more like a garden-variety CLE Program. Attend-
ance ordinarily does not pose an unreasonable risk to public confi-
dence in the integrity of any individual judge. Given the ability of
judges to think critically about what they learn, and the availability
of other sources of learning, it is unlikely that any one program will
significantly influence any given judge's views on the law in a direc-
tion that matters to any particular litigation involving a corporate
funder. In any event, the risk that the public will infer that some
group of potential parties is influencing the particular judge's deci-
sion making in their favor, and that the public will therefore lose
confidence in the individual judge's impartiality, may be out-
weighed by the strong public policy in favor of judicial education.
Privatized Judicial Education, however, poses an additional risk.
The public may infer that many judges are being influenced in little
ways over time. The private entity can essentially take over the
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field of judicial education on the subject of law and economics and
will therefore be able to influence the judiciary as a whole to adopt
a philosophy that favors the corporate funders. Those with a com-
peting view of law and economics-e.g., individuals who may be
adverse to corporations-cannot afford to establish an entity to of-
fer expenses-paid education from a competing perspective. Fur-
ther, because many judges are being educated from the same
perspective, the opinions and other writings produced by individual
judges who are influenced by the programs will, in turn, influence
judges who have not attended. The risk is diminished confidence
not simply in the integrity of any individual judge but in the integ-
rity of the judiciary as an institution. This is a problem of institu-
tional policy, not ethics. The problem is the appearance that
private corporations with a conservative ideology have taken over
judicial education in an area that has considerable impact on a class
of cases involving corporate interests, and that this education is
having a large impact on decision making by the judiciary as a
whole, if not by judges individually. Existing judicial regulation
does not address this problem posed by collective action by mem-
bers of the judiciary. The regulation focuses on problems of indi-
vidual judges' ethics, not problems of institutional integrity.
Individual judges, as a matter of individual discretion, might de-
cline to take advantage of Privatized Judicial Education in order to
preserve public respect for the integrity of the judiciary. But no
individual judge has an incentive to do so. If an individual judge
refrains from participating, public respect for the judiciary is pre-
served little if at all. If there is, in fact, a public perception that the
philosophy of the judiciary is being reshaped by private interests
because judges are attending these programs en masse, that per-
ception will not be mitigated simply because a particular judge
stays home. At the same time, that judge will be depriving himself
of an otherwise desirable opportunity to rub elbows with other
judges and learn an important subject from knowledgeable aca-
demics in a resort setting. To put it somewhat differently, public
respect for the judiciary as an institution is a common asset. Those
judges who participate in Privatized Judicial Education slightly di-
minish public respect for the judiciary but do not take this external
cost into account, because they are motivated to take account of
only the cost to themselves of not attending. But all the little
harms to public confidence add up. The question this raises is
whether the aggregate harm caused by the drop in public confi-
dence outweighs the public benefit of a better educated judiciary.
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Since institutional questions of this nature cannot be addressed
effectively by individual judges either by application of existing
regulation or as a matter of individual discretion, the question
should be addressed institutionally. Representative bodies of the
judiciary, especially the Judicial Conference of the United States,
are the preferable institutions for several reasons. First, there is a
tradition of judicial self-regulation, which in part reflects concerns
about separation of powers. Second, the judiciary, through the
adoption of additional judicial ethics rules or through the expan-
sion of the self-regulatory process, is capable of addressing the
question of judicial education with subtlety and with respect for
relevant competing considerations. Congressional legislation, in
contrast, might lack such subtlety and respect.
The Judicial Conference should formally examine the question
of judicial education in a manner that includes input from bar as-
sociations, legal academics, and others who may have relevant
views. Traditionally, the development of ethics rules, including the
rules of conduct for judges, has involved a broadly inclusive pro-
cess;24 5 in addressing what is essentially a new question in institu-
tional ethics, institutions of the judiciary should proceed in a
similar fashion.
The judiciary may decide in the end to approve judges' participa-
tion in judicial seminars because the risks to judicial integrity are
outweighed by the interest in judicial education; if so, an explana-
tion of why it reached that conclusion may help blunt criticisms.
Alternatively, after study and public comment, the judiciary may
reach the opposite conclusion and opt to restrict judges' attend-
ance. There are, of course, many intermediate alternatives. The
judiciary may adopt guidelines that judicial seminars, and entities
providing them, must follow in order for judges to be permitted to
attend. It may condition judges' attendance on the sponsoring in-
stitutions' agreement to permit some oversight by a representative
body or on the involvement of such a body in planning the semi-
nars to ensure that they are high quality and that they satisfy stan-
dards of academic integrity. Whatever the judiciary ultimately
concludes should have greater legitimacy because of the institu-
tion's full and open deliberations.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
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CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, hundreds of judges have attended
expenses-paid law-and-economics seminars sponsored by private
entities that receive funding from corporations and conservative
foundations. Judges have been criticized for doing so. Although
their participation does not run afoul of existing judicial ethics
rules, that is, in part, because of the incompleteness of the current
framework of judicial regulation. Judicial ethics rules address
problems confronted by individual judges, not by the judiciary as
an institution. But the judicial seminars pose an institutional prob-
lem, not just an individual one. If a single judge went to a single
program, no matter how biased, few would care. The public's con-
cern is that federal and state judiciaries are being transformed as
institutions, as private entities with a conservative ideological cast
have coopted the process of educating judges. The appearance, if
not the reality, is that, by taking over the function of judicial educa-
tion, these private entities have greatly influenced decision making
by the judiciary as a whole, if not by all judges individually, in a
direction favorable to the legal interests and preferences of the cor-
porations that fund the programs. Whether the concern is a fair
one is debatable. But it seems clear that this is a concern that the
judiciary ought to address on an institutional basis.
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